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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
o address a most difficult question, we benefited from presentations by Julian Lindley-French 
(Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich and Defence Academy of the UK), Andrei 
Zagorski (MGIMO-University, Moscow) and Peter Berger (New America Foundation and John 
Hopkins University). These were complemented by written and oral contributions from Hekmat 
Karzai (CASE National Security Institute, Kabul) and Ismail Khan (The Dawn Group of Newspapers, 
Peshawar). 
Before the experts delivered their oral presentations, the chairman put three questions to them: 
•  Can a NATO-led operation (even one in which the European Union would be doing the 
‘civilian’ work) succeed or is internationalisation (‘de-Westernisation’) a prerequisite for 
success and if so, under what entities? 
•  Can a form of stability be established without the incorporation of Pashtun concerns (an issue 
much discussed in Julian Lindley-French’s paper)? 
•  Is the status quo (as opposed to either a successful outcome or outright failure) anyone’s 
preferred option? 
After a severe critique of European policy (characterised by the failure of strategic imagination) and 
American attitudes (notably the ‘not invented here’ syndrome), Julian Lindley-French made several 
points: 
•  The West as a group has the resources to succeed but wider and deeper engagement is 
necessary, and this entails de-Westernisation. All 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) 
need to be multilateralised. There must be no “hiding places”. 
•  The West has to remind all and sundry that it is not in Afghanistan out of altruism – its vital 
security interests are at stake. There would be major consequences regionally and globally if the 
Afghanistan venture were to end in division and failure. This outcome would spell the end of 
NATO and of the EU as a defence organisation. The potential is high for estrangement between 
the United States and the United Kingdom (and a handful of other countries) on one hand and 
most of the continental powers on the other. Furthermore, Euro-isolationism is a real risk. He 
reminded us inter alia that vision without a strategy is delusion and a strategy without 
commitment is deceit. 
Andrei Zagorski had been asked to focus on the lessons from the long period of Soviet presence (from 
1975 onwards) and military intervention (from the end of 1979 to 1989) in Afghanistan. The first 
lesson he drew was “If you don’t believe in a mission, don’t get into it”. The Soviets had few illusions 
about their ability to transform Afghan society and yet that is what they tried to do. The second lesson 
is to avoid saying, “You can’t afford to fail”. This idea can lead to overcommitment in trying to 
implement an impossible mission. 
Lesson number three is that the amount of material and human assistance counts, but less so than its 
quality: indeed, the greater the assistance, the less its quality and the more the people, the less their 
average quality. Lesson number four is to not set “perfect” goals such as transforming a society – learn 
instead how to work with imperfect partners in developing broad ownership of the mission. 
Peter Berger noted some of the basic differences between the West’s involvement and that of the 
former Soviet Union (“We didn’t kill 1.5 million people and drive out 5 million Afghans”). He 
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remarked that the West has the ability to “surge” but that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are back. There is 
widespread perception of the weakness (and the ongoing weakening) of the Karzai presidency, 
notwithstanding his initial 55% electoral success, partly across ethnic lines. Without the drug 
economy, there would not be much left: there is an absolute need to subsidise other produce. Above 
and beyond initial US mistakes (under-resourced operations, not allowing the International Security 
Assistance Force out of Kabul and letting the drug economy develop), current aid policies are largely 
failing in the face of local absorption limits and the recycling of much of the aid back into Western 
pockets. 
There has been a successful amnesty programme, however, with a low recidivism rate. Conversely, in 
the tribal areas of Pakistan, neither militarisation nor appeasement has worked. Much could be gained 
by focusing on specific mosques and clerics. 
In his response, Hekmat Karzai stressed that aid should have been greater than it has been (after all, 
80% of Afghan infrastructure has been destroyed) and more directly handled by the Afghan 
government. He considered that most Afghans still support the Western intervention. The Taliban 
campaign has been largely aimed against education, with 160 schools destroyed by them in 2006. In 
reacting to the paper by Julian Lindley-French, he expressed broad agreement, but with the significant 
reservation that the Taliban resurgence is not a consequence of Pashtun grievances. Vis-à-vis Andrei 
Zagorski’s lessons from the former Soviet Union, he noted that the Soviets simply did not understand 
the local scene and that the same situation is being repeated now – yet the population is the centre of 
gravity. He concurred with the lesson that there is no success in trying to create a society in one’s 
image. One of the lessons of the Soviet presence is that it placed too much emphasis on the capital and 
the major towns; the Soviets never secured the rural areas. The same mistake is being made by many 
of the PRTs. 
In his response, Ismail Khan made clear that both the Pashtun and Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence agency are major factors and that not too much should be made of the absence of an 
explicit discussion thereof in his paper. He dwelled on the pendulum swings between militarisation 
and engagement in both North and South Waziristan, noting that the local tribes, in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, tend to side with the group that is seen as winning. He argued that the approach taken in 
the case of the Musa Qala agreement is necessary, because no development could occur without a 
degree of stability and security; notably, the Taliban were not happy with the Musa Qala agreement 
between the UK forces and the local leaders. He made the point that peace in Afghanistan could mean 
trouble in Pakistan, because their militants from the tribal areas could turn their guns on Pakistan 
rather than become involved in Afghanistan. (This important contention provoked, in the subsequent 
discussion, a remark about the dangers of beggar-thy-neighbour policies.) In his view there hardly 
exists a Pakistani strategy; furthermore, the recent spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan sends a 
message to Islamabad that it should not try to stop cross-border infiltration ahead of the spring 
offensive. Overall, as an institution, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency is now targeting the 
Taliban. He argued that the presence of 80,000 Pakistani troops in 167 border posts should be enough 
to patrol the boundary but a blind eye is sometimes turned out of fear of reprisals against isolated 
posts. 
In the opening round of discussions, the question of Iran’s policy was posed, while an EU official 
noted that Afghan drugs are now having a corrupting and damaging effect in the fragile states and 
populations of Central Asia. Given that some 10,000 tonnes of chemical precursors are being imported 
into Afghanistan for drug processing, such substances should be tracked. On the question of 
capabilities, Julian Lindley-French was queried by a military analyst about the possibility of squaring 
the admonition that the West needs to increase its effort with the observation that we already face a 
capabilities crunch. 
In response, Hekmat Karzai remarked on Iran’s great activity on all fronts (commerce, aid and 
intelligence), noting that the Iranians are now waiting for the West’s next move. On drugs, he 
reminded us that if we do not deal with drugs, drugs will deal with us. Physical eradication is largely a CHAIRMAN’S SUMMING-UP | 3 
 
waste of time; the real issue is the generation of alternate resources. On capabilities, he assumed that 
NATO’s attention span could hardly be expected to last more than a decade. 
Julian Lindley-French suggested that it should be possible to engage the Iranians on a specific track 
concerning Afghanistan. Moving to India’s involvement (Hekmat Karzai having observed that India is 
still seen as exercising a major positive influence), he considered that it is playing a game that could 
be called “What happens after the West is gone?”, in other words, thinking in terms of future relations 
with Islamabad. On drugs, he reiterated the view that alternate crops have to be subsidised. He also 
suggested that there should be some form of de facto autonomy for the Pashtun on both sides of the 
border, while respecting the Durand line, holding that the Pashtun are key to the security situation. On 
capabilities, he stressed that conflict and reconstruction must be viewed not as sequential but as 
simultaneous; this requires a doctrinal shift and a harmonisation of civil–military capabilities among 
NATO, the EU, the UN and the regional players. Finally, he indicated that US–UK relations 
concerning Afghanistan have suffered as a result of US action against the Musa Qala agreement. 
Ismail Khan held that for the Taliban, religious motivation is of the essence rather than a sense of 
Pashtun identity. 
Peter Berger remarked that Iran has done nothing basically wrong in Afghanistan; moreover, Iran is on 
the receiving end of the drug problem. He agreed that poppy eradication would not help, as it will send 
more people into the arms of the Taliban. Substitutes and subsidies are the answer, whereas at present 
we are spending more money on eradication than paying farmers to stop growing drugs. 
Andrei Zagorski stressed that although Tehran has no reason to bring the Taliban back, it will be 
tempting for Iran to hurt the West in Afghanistan. Concerning the penetration of rural regions, he 
argued that it is neither necessary nor desirable, since it is a source of trouble; instead, what you need 
is a strong interface. 
In a second round of questions, an Indian official disagreed with the proposition that Delhi is playing a 
waiting game and highlighted the $750 million of Indian assistance. A German analyst raised the issue 
of those Western allies who do not want to go south; he indicated that the Afghan government wants 
the Germans to stay in the north. A Dutch analyst wondered how one could channel more aid through 
the Afghan government given its weak structure. An EU official underscored the fact that the EU 
alone had made a seven-year commitment in Afghanistan. He noted that there were many calls for 
“Afghanistisation”, but like the previous participant, he too wondered how one could do that outside 
of Kabul. He noted the great difficulty of building up the rule of law on the basis of three legal 
systems (traditional rules, Sharia law and Western norms). 
A Pakistani official pointed out that Pakistan deserves gratitude, since it had made possible the 
overthrow of the Taliban after having hosted over 4 million refugees. More than 700 Pakistani soldiers 
had been killed in the Waziristan operation. Some 35,000 Afghans are crossing the Afghan border 
legally on a daily basis. 
A NATO official remarked that the process is actually worse than the content: we have great trouble in 
going beyond a piecemeal ad hoc approach. 
A defence analyst expressed interest in the effectiveness of actual and potential measures aimed at 
controlling the Afghan border and the chairman asked our guests for their views on a contact group 
format for dealing with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a question was put by the CEPS representative 
concerning ‘Greater Afghanistan’: Who wants it and is it serious? 
Ismail Khan noted that 74% of the population of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan speak 
Pashtun while the 3.5 million inhabitants of the seven tribal areas are mostly Pashtun (of which 
700,000 live outside of the government unit in South Waziristan). Nevertheless, “Pashtunistan” is a 
nationalism that has been diluted with economic improvement in Pakistan (the North-West Frontier 
Province comes immediately after the Punjab in terms of economic prosperity). 4 | FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG 
 
Hekmat Karzai remarked that there is a massive brain drain in Afghanistan from the government to the 
aid agencies, a process that weakens the government. While expressing gratitude for the support 
Pakistan’s people provided while he was a refugee, he noted that Afghan–Pakistani relations tend to 
mimic Indo–Pakistani relations, despite the fact that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are Muslim 
countries. He viewed the revival of the grand loya jirga for the Pashtun on both sides of the border as 
a positive step. 
Peter Berger raised the issue of the legalisation of growing poppies for medicinal purposes. He agreed 
that Pakistan had been instrumental in the fall of the Taliban – but that it had also contributed to their 
rise. 
Andrei Zagorski did not take kindly to the notion of mining the border between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (to prevent militants from crossing); setting aside other considerations this has never 
worked. On the overall situation, he considered that we needed to define what would be a satisfactory 
outcome. 
Julian Lindley-French stressed that if we fail in Afghanistan, the strategic situation for India and 
Pakistan would worsen, particularly for Pakistan. He repeated the serious effect German reticence was 
having on UK–German relations. And in conclusion, he supported the idea of creating a contact group.  
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‘Afghanistan-lite’: The Crunch 
Julian Lindley-French* 
Introduction 
Afghanistan is at a crunch point. Put simply, either the 37 countries currently engaged in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan through the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) recognise and stand up to the enormity of the challenge (and the opportunity) or the West’s 
signature mission will fail at the start of the new strategic age. Those are the stakes. In other words, 
Afghanistan is about so much more than Afghanistan. Today, there are not enough resources, in spite 
of the $10 billion pledged by donors. And, even at 35,000 strong, there are not enough forces 
(helicopters or troops). The Afghan people, who have a tradition of backing those most likely to 
prevail, have lost or are losing faith in the West. It is a set of failing circumstances that must be 
changed and changed rapidly if the defeatism that is beginning to predominate in the West is not to 
spread. 
Such defeatism is in fact a paradox because given cohesion and political will the West could actually 
generate the power and effect so required. Indeed, the West today is the richest, most powerful 
grouping the world has ever known but for reasons best known to its leaders, it is attempting to change 
the very nature of security governance with at least one metaphorical arm tied behind its collective 
back. Ultimately, it is not the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the Pashtun who are threatening the West with 
failure, complex though the situation in Afghanistan may be. Rather, it is the refusal of political 
leaders in the West to recognise the importance of success, the full implications of failure and invest 
accordingly. Moreover, it is failure that is leading inexorably to the coalescence of Taliban, al-Qaeda 
and Pashtun interests, something that would have been unthinkable when Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) began on 7 October 2001.  
The core message of this analysis is therefore simple: now is the time to re-double the effort, not 
reduce it. If the West is not to lose Afghanistan, and with it much of its strategic leadership credibility, 
then the petty infighting and double-speak of the past three years must end. This is an age of strategic 
change in desperate need of grand stability. Furthermore, the successful governance of such change 
must necessarily be founded on security architecture with the enlightened West as its cornerstone. 
Consequently, Afghanistan will help to define not just the age, but also the role of the West therein. 
Therefore, the short-sighted and self-defeating factional game playing in the West that places marginal 
advantage before strategic effect must end. It is doing incalculable damage, not just to the future of 
Afghanistan, but also to the future of Europeans and North Americans alike in a world more 
dangerous by the day. Make no mistake, if the West is forced out of Afghanistan and the Karzai 
regime in Kabul evaporates, like that of the Najibullah regime before it, then the message to friends 
and foe alike will be clear – given time, given effort and given resolve, the West will always be forced 
out. No one said it would be easy, but mission impossible? Only if the West chooses to make it so. 
This analysis looks at the situation in Afghanistan on four levels – the grand strategic, the regional–
strategic, the Afghan national and the military–operational. It then concludes with a brief agenda for 
the future. History has been hard on Afghanistan but the West today is neither the America of 1970s 
Vietnam nor the Soviet Union of 1980s Afghanistan. It is time the West got on with the job of doing 
what it takes to make Afghanistan work. There can be no ‘Afghanistan-lite’. 
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The new great game – The grand strategic crunch  
Afghanistan-lite represents a collective failure of strategic imagination in the West. In addition, 
Afghanistan has become the place where the over-militarised American war on terror has come face to 
face with the overcivilianised and locally focused anachronism of contemporary European 
peacekeeping. Consequently, both elements are forced to apply what they have, in pursuit of what they 
must do in a place notoriously unforgiving on those who fail to comprehend the relationship between 
strategic impact and the dark side of globalisation.  
This failure of strategic imagination is founded upon several factors: first, an American 
oversimplification of what is required to generate effect in a place where the borders drawn by 19
th 
century Europeans have little or no meaning to the people on the ground. Second, there is a collective 
psychosis about the influence of history, particularly in Europe, that makes its re-living all the more 
likely. Third, there is a lack of consensus over the role of Afghanistan in the sense of grand stability. 
This is partly because of poor American strategic leadership since 2001, and partly because too many 
Europeans put doing the least possible there before doing what must be done to render the place stable. 
Fourth, it is a consequence of the inversion of the natural order through a profound confusion over 
values and interests, which has placed democracy before stability and conflated the two. Fifth, there is 
a simple lack of cash to outbid the Taliban for the support of the Pashtun.  
As a result, nothing like the resources have been invested in Afghanistan that its grand strategic 
importance demands and nothing like the political cohesion is being generated that is vital to success. 
Current operations in Afghanistan take place in a region that is not only becoming the centre of gravity 
of world security but also where many of the actors thereabouts are themselves emerging as grand 
strategic players. They are all watching and waiting to understand the extent or otherwise of Western 
resolve and will draw conclusions accordingly as to whether the West is to be supported or not. Iran, 
flanked on either border by Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, is gauging not only the collective 
resolve of the West but also whether such an entity retains any wider meaning, given Tehran’s own 
regional ambitions. Russia, still smarting over its ‘defeat’ in the cold war, still obsessed by NATO and 
still conscious of the support the West gave to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, seems 
willing to do little to pave the way for success. China, emerging on the world stage, notes with interest 
the inner-game of Western politics and concludes that when push comes to shove European support 
for American strategic leadership is to say the very least lukewarm as far as matters Asian are 
concerned. India, conscious of China’s growing influence and all too aware of the implications of 
Western failure in the North-West Frontier for disputed Jammu and Kashmir waits and watches to see 
if the new strategic partnership with the West will be one worth having. The West today may be more 
idea than place, but is it one that new powers still see as credible in a new world? Like it or not, 
Afghanistan will do much to answer that question. Thus, the utility, bona fides and credibility of the 
West must be demonstrated to states, people and those of faith alike and it will take much time and 
great effort to do so. That begs two questions: Has the West got the stomach for it? Is the West up to 
it? 
Equally, those in Europe who think that the West in any case no longer exists and propose simply 
withdrawing from Afghanistan need to think long and hard. The British went into Afghanistan in the 
late 19
th century partly to obstruct Russian ambitions for a warm sea port, but also because of the 
instability of the North-West Frontier and the pressure it was placing on British India. The Soviets 
went into Afghanistan in 1979 mainly because of concerns over the growing influence of radical Islam 
in its southern republics. In other words, Afghanistan has long been a crossroads of influence and a 
theatre for strategic and regional change. Indeed, that is part of Afghanistan’s tragedy. Today, the very 
nature of globalisation means that ‘black holes’ of security are not simply lost to civilised order. 
Connectivity and disorder are strange bedfellows but in this world, illegal activity can rapidly make 
them so. As a consequence, such places very quickly become the epicentres of strategic crime, where 
business in illegal commodities are at their most intense, be it hard drugs, small arms or weapons of 
mass destruction.  ‘AFGHANISTAN-LITE’: THE CRUNCH | 7 
 
Therefore, contemporary security policy is more often than not about hard choices in hard places like 
Afghanistan. Withdrawal is not an option because unmolested strategic crime and systemic terrorism 
will chase the West back to its own back streets. Again, like it or not, pulling out of Afghanistan will 
greatly exacerbate ‘blowback’, not least because in this age the democratisation of mass destruction, 
which is the dark side of globalisation, means that anyone can get anything given time, determination 
and freedom from the pressure of positive power. Thus, the only ‘option’ is to stay and make the 
benefits of legality outweigh what is by Western standards the benefits of illegality across the broad 
spectrum of criminal effect. 
That is a message that resonates across the great belt of instability, which has its buckle in 
Afghanistan. For the broader Middle East, the regimes there and those who seek to overturn them, the 
loss of Afghanistan will have a strategic eloquence that will resonate far and wide. Why? Because 
unlike Iraq the West is engaged in Afghanistan as the legitimate West and if it loses there then the 
whole concept of the West as the cornerstone security power in the new grand strategic architecture 
will be dealt the most searing of blows. What price Europe’s and North America’s vital resources 
then?  
And yet, the sheer economic power of the West means it is doomed to retain the leadership mantle. 
The East might be emerging, but the West is not declining. It is another paradox of this strange 
strategic age that there is as yet no Newtonian balance between growth and decline. China and India 
may collectively represent 30% of global gross domestic product by 2020 but today North America 
and Western Europe together represent some 70% of it. Even the most pessimistic of economic 
assumptions suggest that by 2020 North America and Western Europe will still be the dominant 
economic, political and strategic grouping in the world. This view makes the West’s half-hearted 
attempts in Afghanistan at first glance so puzzling. The West has invested nothing like the resources in 
pursuit of success that it could. The reason for this is far more than the lingering discord over Iraq, 
which continues to pollute the mission in Afghanistan. It is more than the collective weakness or 
absence of European strategic vision. It is rather to do with the very incertitude back home in the West 
that the likes of al-Qaeda seek to create. The West is profoundly split about the balance to be struck 
between projection and protection. Thus, what passes for ‘strategy’ has become focused on the 
delusion of millions (particularly in Europe) that they are not engaged in a war. It is also about the 
maintenance of that delusion by breaking the link between the provision of security and its cost. It is 
about governments having to end the strategic vacation and telling people that taxes will have to be 
increased. It is about the defeat of the long term by the short term. It is about the absence of 
leadership.  
Tragically, the popular security delusion has broken the essential link between much of Western 
society and the young men and women who act on their behalf in places like Afghanistan. That is why 
one sees the emergence of military ghettoes across the West full of soldiers and their families under 
the most intense pressure, detached from a society that understands little of what they do and cares 
even less.  
Afghanistan is a grand strategic crunch. It is time to face up to that reality and act, organise and invest 
accordingly.  
Rescuing the state – The regional strategic crunch 
Afghanistan is not so much a state as a space in which the interest of players is played out. There are 
many players – states and non-states alike. Indeed, the end-state of the West’s involvement has much 
to do with rescuing the state in Central and South Asia. Afghanistan is thus the pith of the regional–
strategic game over order and hierarchy in the region. Sadly, for many of the actors engaged there the 
game is increasingly about what happens after the West has gone. In its most pressing form, this 
regional–strategic game concerns the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan as states. Without doubt, 
there can be no solution to Afghanistan without a permanent settlement in Pakistan and herein lies the 
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essential dilemma. Islamabad is in an invidious position, trapped between its external relations with 
the West and others, such as India and China, and its internal cocktail of secularism, fundamentalism 
and tribalism.  
Therefore, if the West is to prove itself a credible, long-term, strategic security stabiliser it must be 
equally credible in its commitments to both Kabul and Islamabad. Much of the credibility of the West 
in the region and the wider Islamic world will be founded on the role it plays in resolving the 
Pakistan–Afghanistan–Pashtun triangle. Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz was right during a 
visit to NATO on 30 January 2007 when he said, “Pakistan is committed to a strong, stable 
Afghanistan. The one country that will benefit most, after Afghanistan itself, will be Pakistan.” At the 
very least the West must convince those senior Pakistanis equivocal about the West’s role in 
Afghanistan that Pakistan’s best hope for such an outcome is full support for the OEF and ISAF and 
the wider, comprehensive security approach the West is trying to foster. Moreover, winning Pakistan 
could over time help to persuade many in the Islamic world, wherever they may be, that latter-day 
grand stability missions led by the West are not the latest iteration of some crusading/imperialist 
impulse. At the very least, there needs to be a stronger Islamic flavour to current operations in 
Afghanistan in spite of the presence of Albanians, Azeris and Turks in the ISAF. 
Equally, significant parts of the Islamic world are in some form of devotional civil war and this 
conflict undermines the very states, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, which by definition of being 
states owe their origins to the organisation of power and society by the West. Thus, there is a 
continuum between geo-politics, state security and stability, and human security, which finds its centre 
of gravity and its crisis point in that region. Certainly, the strategic continuum should be central to the 
strategic narrative that the West has proved so poor at telling be it to those at home or to those whom it 
seeks to assist. The message is a simple one: while the West is committed to a stable state structure, it 
does not and will not seek to influence the creed of any state. At the same time, the West will confront 
all forms of extremism that threaten order. That is why a regional–strategic solution is so pressing. The 
possibility of the Pakistani nuclear programme falling into extremist Islamist hands with a jihadist 
agenda cannot be discounted. Such a possibility is clearly linked to the ability of such elements to 
operate and organise almost with impunity in Waziristan and across the northern areas, and thus the 
strengthening of the Pakistani state is as much an essential interest of the West as the strengthening of 
the Afghan state.  
While the West must help strengthen both the Pakistani and Afghan states, it must also grasp the 
pivotal importance of a Pashtun settlement. Finding a solution to the Pashtun dilemma on both sides of 
the border is in many ways the crux of the entire mission. The easing of the dilemma will require 
sacrifices. It will entail the ending of efforts by those in Kabul who dream of a ‘Greater Afghanistan’ 
and the neutering of those elements in Pakistani intelligence who believe that the ambitions of India 
(rightly or wrongly) in Afghanistan and the north-west territories must be countered, even if that 
means implicitly or explicitly supporting the Taliban in its struggle against ‘foreigners’. Changing that 
dynamic will only be achieved if the West demonstrates once and for all that the ‘after the West has 
gone’ game is not an option.  
Indeed, only through the easing of the Pashtun dilemma will the re-separation of Taliban, al-Qaeda 
and Pashtun interests likely be achieved, which is crucial. A not insignificant part of the dilemma 
stems from the Durand line, which separates south-east Afghanistan from north-west Pakistan. Drawn 
by a British imperial official in 1893, it denies the Pashtun an effective homeland. But that was then 
and this is now. An ideal approach would be to carve out a new homeland from the areas of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan for the Pashtun. Yet such a ‘solution’ would clearly offend both Islamabad and Kabul 
to the point of rupture in their relations with the West. At the same time, both capitals must understand 
that there is a price for the continued support of both capitals by the West and surely the offer of de 
facto autonomy for a Pashtun homeland could be one such instrument. This approach would shift the 
interests of Pashtun leaders back to supporting both states and the West and thus break the link with ‘AFGHANISTAN-LITE’: THE CRUNCH | 9 
 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who still operate across the ‘border’ with impunity and apparently total 
alacrity, especially since the Waziristan Accords of 5 September 2006.  
Radical though such a solution may be, it is necessary that this kind of lateral thinking be at least put 
on the table, because a regional–strategic solution is essential to success and that will only take place if 
the old imperial band-aid is replaced with something more reflective of the reality on the ground. The 
first step is thus to generate solidarity through a common appreciation of the problem, particularly 
among the all-important intelligence communities (which are so much more and in some cases can be 
players in their own right). Albeit modest, such hopes received a significant boost with the creation of 
the Afghan, ISAF, Pakistan Intelligence Centre in Kabul. It is a start. The rescuing of the state will 
require a re-arranging of relationships over time that will need to be smoothed, of course, by the 
expeditious use of large amounts of Western aid and support. With a new spring offensive by the 
Taliban in the offing this kind of lateral thinking is an imperative.  
Making Afghanistan work – The national crunch 
The Afghan people, especially those in the south and east, have suffered long and hard. It is not 
surprising that they are suspicious of the promises of foreigners. They have heard and seen it all before 
and it can be expected that have little trust for outsiders. Creating an Afghanistan that can and will 
improve the lot of its people is no easy task. That has traditionally been the role of the clan or tribe 
rather than the state, although there have been periods when the state has functioned to more or less 
effect. The model so chosen has been to try to embrace those with power by bringing them within the 
framework of legitimate government. The complexities of that approach have been evident since the 
establishment of the loya jirga [grand council] in 2003 and through national and regional elections. 
Nevertheless, some success has been realised. In what the British would recognise as a classically 
colonial method of governance, this has meant buying off warlords and tribal chiefs and attempting to 
bring them into government. Strangely, the West has failed to buy the people as well, which in the 
overall scheme of things would represent a modest investment. 
Still, such an approach has its weaknesses and it can only be justified if there is a parallel 
strengthening of regional government and governance. The paradox is that while it is critical that such 
controversial figures as General Rashid Dostum, General Atta Mohammed and either Gul Agha 
Sherzai or Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf (or both) are brought into government their bitter rivalry and past 
warlordism has prevented the establishment of a better balance in central government. Thus, the 
complexity faced by the West in Afghanistan is compounded by the very solution sought. That is 
Afghanistan. Its complexity is reinforced in the crucial south and east by the role of the mainly Uzbek 
and Tajik Northern Alliance, which aided the American-led coalition back in 2001. So many of the 
Afghan people have become disillusioned by so many ‘familiar’ and unwelcome faces re-appearing in 
and around the government – elections or no elections. This disillusionment will take time to dissipate. 
There is no easy solution. It will of course take time to change the dynamic of leadership in 
Afghanistan and there are certain power realities that cannot be avoided. Frankly, for the foreseeable 
future the price – and there will be a price – of buying stability will be high. Far greater efforts will be 
needed to improve the behaviour of those with tainted pasts, render transparent their current dealings 
and provide confidence, as well as alternative sources of income to poppy production. According to 
the UN, Afghanistan produced 92% of the world’s opium in 2006, some 30% more than the market 
can bear and which is up some 500% since 2002. Only 6 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces are now drug-
free. However one looks at it, the ISAF has overseen the re-emergence of the world’s largest narco-
economy. The very real question is whether the West has the will to make the investment that could 
wean farmers and tribes off such produce and the will to stand firm against those in government and 
beyond with connections to it. That is a big question.  
Clearly, any ‘solution’ to this conundrum is not going to happen now or next year but requires an 
enormous security investment over many years, 90% of which will need to be civilian in nature. At the 
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term of the institutions of state, with specific reference to re-building the judicial system, police and 
the Afghan National Army. Second is the progressive involvement of regional partners also keen on a 
stable Afghanistan in a practical reconstruction role that creates a new, legitimate ‘single’ market in 
the region. Third is the progressive civilianisation of the West’s presence in Afghanistan linked to an 
economic plan for the further restructuring of the Afghan economy. Then over time, one objective 
must be the de-Westernisation of both the mission and the presence. Fourth, justice must be seen to be 
done. It is important that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is apprehended as soon as possible and brought to 
justice for the range of attacks he has instigated. It is even more important that the rampant corruption 
is weeded out and seen to be so. Fifth, Afghanistan’s capacity to absorb aid must be markedly 
improved. 
Ultimately, central to the Afghan conundrum is the reconstitution of viable local administration. As 
indicated above it is requisite to the long-term stability of Afghanistan and at least as important as a 
strong government in Kabul. There will be setbacks but the British and the UN are right to see 
initiatives to strengthen regional and local government and governance as crucial. Washington needs 
to support such efforts and avoid the ‘not invented here’ attitude that too often undermines the efforts 
of coalition partners, particularly as it relates to the Musa Qala agreement (and its like) with the 
Pashtun. Ethnically dominant in the south and east of the country, they represent a deeply tribal 
society that is split into many different clan-based groupings. They are long used to arguing over 
everything: the distribution of money, drugs, guns, access to education, water and business (legal and 
illegal). Nonetheless, a form of order does assert itself with the right incentives. The Pashtun by and 
large feel that the 2005 elections to the National Assembly did not further their interests (and it is 
tribal interests that matter) and have regrettably thus returned to more traditional tactics such as 
violence and intimidation. This basic dynamic has enabled the Taliban to reconstitute and given al-
Qaeda the space and protection to begin to restore some form of command structure. There will 
always be a complex mix of tribe, religion and money that dictates relationships but history suggests 
that such a reality should not prevent efforts to do business with dominant groupings, such as the 
Alozia tribe. It might also help if more effort was put into curbing demand for heroin in the West.  
The bottom line is this: one cannot ultimately be effective in a place such as Afghanistan without also 
being legitimate. That works two ways. First, the transfer of authority for the construction of civil 
society must be handed over to the UN as soon as possible. Second, the ongoing building of trust with 
tribal elders and moderate mullahs must continue. It must be in their interests to change. If that means 
buying such influence for a time then so be it. However one cuts it the key to this is an awful lot of 
Western money. Hopefully, such a project in time can involve the money of the newly rich, such as 
China and India, and the classically rich such as Japan. The ‘Afghanistan/London Compact’ was a 
beginning but much more is needed, because while Afghanistan is a test for the West, it is also a test 
for the whole system of institutionalised security governance that all the big powers claim to support. 
If such a global approach and effort is not adopted, then for all the Stage 4 expansion of the ISAF and 
the work of the 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), NATO’s mission and by extension that of 
the West will come down to the open-ended protection of a little-loved and unrepresentative 
government in and around Kabul. If that is the case then Afghanistan is not working. 
Filling the security space – The capability–capacity crunch 
NATO forces are doing an admirable job in many parts of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Western forces 
in Afghanistan face a capability–capacity crunch. Indeed, armed forces designed to create the security 
space are rarely capable of filling it over time, intensity and distance. Without wishing to 
underestimate the difficulty of their role in such a place, the search-and-destroy forces attached to 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have a reasonably clear mandate and mission. Unfortunately, 
Afghanistan, as so often in the past, is exposing the weaknesses and contradictions of Western military 
planning over the last 15 years. It may well be the case now that respective missions of counter-
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day then ‘unbuilding’ or even ‘non-building’ when the military have created the security space the 
next hardly demonstrates the shared sense of mission that is demanded by such complex places and a 
comprehensive approach to a strategic and security impact. The plain fact is that the forces in 
Afghanistan are organised to mask weakness, not to generate effect. 
The European concept of peacekeeping, encapsulated in the 1992 Petersberg tasks of rescue and 
humanitarian missions, and the role of combat troops in peacemaking belong to a different time and a 
different place. Within the context of Afghanistan, they are hopelessly anachronistic as is the mindset 
that underpins them. The refusal of many European allies to support their British, Dutch and Canadian 
partners in robust counter-insurgency operations in the Helmand and Uruzgan provinces is only partly 
owing to political weakness. Afghanistan has exposed the sham of force planning in a host of 
European states that possess neither the numbers nor the quality to sustain operations in such a place if 
organised in such a shambolic way. Consequently, NATO faces the most profound crisis of capacity 
given the forces needed for adequate stabilisation and reconstruction missions. Although 35,000 might 
sound like a formidable force the ratios required to undertake effective operations in a place like 
Afghanistan demands a far greater force. Moreover, the differences in the quality of the equipment, 
training and doctrine of the personnel available to NATO commanders are striking; together these 
differences compound the capability–capacity crunch markedly. 
The capacity crunch has also been compounded by capability-led force transformation. Under 
American leadership, NATO forces have been invited to become more professional, to be more 
effective, more mobile and more lethal. For most NATO nations, however, that has led to a hard 
choice having to be made between such capabilities and the capacity needed to sustain stabilisation 
and reconstruction missions. Some states are trying to find a way to resolve this dilemma through a 
comprehensive approach to security, or what NATO calls Comprehensive Planning and Action (CPA). 
Much of it is predicated on the belief that reconstruction comes after conflict and stabilisation. Yet as 
Afghanistan is so clearly demonstrating, one reconstructs during conflict and stabilisation, not after it. 
Reconstruction is in many ways the essential process that bridges conflict and stabilisation. 
These tensions have led to a virtual breakdown of alliance solidarity, which could have profound 
implications for both NATO and European Union security and defence. Indeed, those Europeans who 
talk about Afghanistan presaging the demise of NATO had better clear their woolly minds, for such a 
failure would also put an end to any hope of effective and relevant European defence. Put simply, trust 
among allies is being lost day by day and will take a long time to recover. In the context of 
Afghanistan it is evident that while states such as the US and UK will continue to endeavour to 
energise chains of command within the OEF and ISAF they will also look for non-European partners 
who over time can be better trusted and perhaps have a better grasp of the significance of current 
change than many Europeans. Make no mistake, relations between the US, the UK, Canada, Australia 
and the Netherlands on one hand, and France, Germany and Italy et al. on the other are being sorely 
tested by Afghanistan. Given the lessons learned, a country such as the UK now has little or no choice 
BUT to look for alternative partners the world over who will likely be more willing to support British 
forces in dangerous places at dangerous moments.  
The situation comes down to this: those Europeans who refuse military support to their allies at crunch 
points had better understand that they have crossed an important threshold and they are no longer seen 
as indispensable allies by the Americans and British.  
Nor is this simply an exclusively European problem. For all its many faults the Musa Qala agreement 
with tribal elders led to a ceasefire with local Taliban forces commanded by the late Mullah Ghaffour, 
which held for some four months. What is more, it opened up a possible similar agreement for the 
northern Helmand town of Nawzad as part of a process of a UN- and British-led counter-radicalisation 
that the US either does not understand or does not want to understand. These are important early steps 
towards trying to change the political dynamics on the ground. The US was wrong to brief so heavily 
against it. What this situation demonstrates again is that too much of the energy being expended in 
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and the overcivilianised (carrot) Europeans, with the British, Dutch and Canadians too often forced to 
be the meat in the sandwich. Hence a further 800 British troops were dispatched to southern 
Afghanistan. At the very least, any state that sends its troops to Afghanistan must make an 
unequivocal commitment to do whatever is needed, wherever it is so required to achieve the necessary 
effect.  
Above all there is an urgent need for a lessons-learned debate within the West about the role of 
coercion, stabilisation and reconstruction in places where the West seems neither welcomed or wanted 
yet which are vital to Western interests. Given the prevailing environment the alternative is that the 
West, or at least the US, simply retreats into a punishment strategy. Certainly, the very real danger 
exists that those who misunderstand Afghanistan and its importance will permit what is a crucial 
debate over the nature of engagement to be hijacked by those who have no strategic concept at all. If 
the danger of ‘losing’ the West’s armed forces down a black hole of Afghan stabilisation and 
reconstruction efforts is deemed greater than the need to establish a stabilisation and reconstruction 
‘shop window’, then the crunch will grind this operation down. If that really is the case then the West 
should stop its own strategic pretence. It should also stop pretending to the Afghan people that the 
West is in for the long haul and committed to the improvement of their lives. If that is the case then the 
West should get out now. Then, at least, the Afghans can sort it out in a traditionally Afghan way, and 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda can return to their core business.  
Nothing dramatic will happen in the short term but the damage is being done. Undoubtedly, a 
continued lack of support or endless disingenuous quibbling over rules of engagement will ultimately 
result in the re-nationalisation of security and defence in Europe and the forming of new partnerships. 
This is what is at stake…and this is a tipping point. 
Afghanistan-lite: The crunch 
To reiterate, Afghanistan is at crunch point. Afghanistan-lite is not working. Decisions taken over the 
next few months will decide whether the West is serious about giving Afghanistan a stability that has 
only ever been known fleetingly or whether it begins the process of disengagement. Over the next 
year, NATO and OEF forces will face repeated attacks by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Moreover, after a 
series of crushing losses at the hands of NATO forces the Taliban will doubtless resort to terrorism 
and other forms of asymmetric warfare. If things go horribly wrong, the Pashtun elders could throw 
their lot in with NATO’s adversaries. Together these circumstances are truly going to be a pivotal 
point in the struggle for Afghanistan.  
At the very least, the West’s Afghanistan agenda should be informed by the issues that are at stake and 
what is needed to widen and deepen its impact in this crucible of strategic effort, as set out below. 
The grand strategic agenda. It is imperative that a new great game is avoided. A contact group 
comprising the West, China, India, Pakistan, Russia and, if possible Iran, would expand ownership of 
the solution and the legitimacy of the engagement. The UN has a key role to play in legitimising such 
a group but the West under American leadership must widen the partnership.  
The regional strategic agenda. Afghanistan’s future is not simply to be found within its borders. The 
whole region needs a new economic grouping underpinned by the West, Russia, India and China, 
which includes the likes of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Iran to 
help develop a model for regional economic interaction. Such group interaction will help to introduce 
the benefits of regional dynamism and in time turn Afghanistan from being a victim of change into a 
beneficiary.  
The national agenda. In solving the problem of the Pashtun, at the very least the challenge of 
Afghanistan will be eased, if not that of the wider region. It is evident that trying to create a strong 
central government in Kabul and then extending its writ to places such as Kandahar is not working. 
Rather, much greater consideration needs to be given to an autonomous, self-administered Pashtun 
region that is overseen by a joint Afghan–Pakistani commission. It is essential that a new relationship ‘AFGHANISTAN-LITE’: THE CRUNCH | 13 
 
be established on both sides of the border between the 28 million Pashtun in Pakistan and the 12.5 
million Pashtun in Afghanistan, Islamabad and Kabul. 
The military–operational agenda. The new US commander of the ISAF, General Dan McNeill, needs  
a)  a strategic reserve that he can deploy to any part of the country at any time should the situation 
so require it. The Taliban (and al-Qaeda) must understand that they will be struck and struck 
hard when they make incursions or break agreements such as that forged in Musa Qala;  
b)  a unity of command covering all the forces in Afghanistan. That includes merging the ISAF and 
OEF; and  
c)  the organisation of all forces and commands on a multinational basis so that the PRTs cannot 
become an excuse for national contingents to ‘hide’.  
Finally, General McNeill will also have to curb his erstwhile lust for air power (earning him the 
nickname ‘bomber’) and prove adept at the balance between the comprehensive approach and counter-
insurgency operations. Above all, he must be given the people and the tools to do the job. A good start 
would be the creation of one force, committed to one end with all the allies willing and able to share 
the burden of effect. 
At this crunch point for Afghanistan, only time will tell if the West has the vision, the commitment 
and the will to invest the resources that only it can. If not, then the crunch will doom not only the 
Afghan people to servitude and misery, but any pretence the West has for the governance of peaceful 
change on this troubled planet. Some places forgive mediocrity; Afghanistan is no such place. No one 
said it would be easy but those are the stakes. 
  
14 |   
Lessons from Soviet Experiences  
of Socialist Modernisation  
in Afghanistan (1978–89) 
Andrei Zagorski* 
he Soviet Afghanistan policy in 1978–89 (from the April 1978 coup organised by the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA to the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989) went 
through several phases. At each stage, a comprehensive set of policy tools was applied by 
Moscow in order to assist the PDPA in a socialist kind of modernisation by political, military, 
economic, social and ideological means. The emphasis in applying those tools was ever-changing, 
depending on the objectives and the lessons learned by the Soviet leadership during this period. 
The coup took Moscow by surprise, but it quickly embraced the ‘April revolution’ and engaged in a 
large-scale Sovietisation experiment. This experiment failed, leaving behind significant fallout. 
Although one could argue that the attempt to implant Soviet practices forcibly in Afghanistan was 
doomed to fail, the experience gathered during those years has broader relevance. While Soviet or 
socialist in nature, it reveals features in common with many other attempts at the accelerated 
modernisation of a poor country with a traditional society. 
At the start of the 1978 coup, the Soviet leadership did not believe in the feasibility of a socialist 
experiment in what it described as a backward feudal country with incapable leadership. Afghanistan 
was not considered ripe for a socialist transformation as it found itself among the poorest countries in 
the world dominated by a rural population engaged in an agrarian economy. Nevertheless, acting 
within the context of the cold war, once the PDPA took over Kabul, Moscow signalled its readiness to 
support the new regime, underpinned by the belief that the Soviet Union could not afford to lose 
Afghanistan to the ‘enemy’. Once this doctrine took hold, it triggered a chain of fatal decisions that 
eventually led the Soviet Union to invade the country in December 1979. 
The focus on preserving a weak, unpopular regime and the identification of the Afghan army as the 
single most important institution for keeping the government in power implied the pre-eminence of 
military means in Moscow’s policy. All the governments in Afghanistan between 1978 and 1992 were 
comfortable with this policy as they did not rely on domestic support and sought a powerful external 
actor to compensate for their weakness. Nevertheless, Soviet policy was not restricted to just providing 
military assistance to Kabul. It applied a complex mix of policy instruments, such as financial and 
technical assistance, economic development and institution- and capacity-building, including the 
training of personnel within the country and abroad. 
This paper focuses on the non-military aspects of Moscow’s reconstruction and modernisation policy 
against the background of developments in Afghanistan in 1978–89. After a brief summary of Soviet 
assistance to Afghanistan prior to the 1978 coup, it discusses Moscow’s agenda for Afghanistan in 
1978–79, before the invasion. During this phase, the Soviet Union concentrated on capacity-building 
and technical assistance in the expectation that this would help to avoid direct intervention. The third 
section summarises Soviet policy between 1980 and 1986, after its invasion of Afghanistan. This 
period is characterised by the heavy reliance of the Karmal government on Moscow and by the 
regime’s failure to ensure domestic political support, particularly in rural areas. The fourth section 
looks at the Soviet exit strategy in 1986–89, which went hand-in-hand with the attempt to achieve a 
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domestic and international political settlement to allow a face-saving pullout of Soviet troops. The 
concluding section presents some generalisations about Soviet experiences with Afghanistan. 
1.  Soviet assistance to Afghanistan prior to the 1978 coup 
Afghanistan had been a Soviet client state since 1919 but was increasingly so after World War II. 
Moscow regularly provided the country with financial assistance, supplied it with arms and trained its 
officers. It helped to develop the country’s infrastructure, which included telegraph and radio 
communications, the construction of roads and pipelines and the modernisation of airports. These 
projects were concentrated in the north of the country, which helped to connect Afghanistan with the 
Soviet Union. Especially after World War II, Moscow engaged in economic development in 
Afghanistan, assisting with the building of electric plants and irrigation systems, raw materials 
extraction (oil, gas and copper), as well as the development of the social infrastructure, such as 
educational facilities. By 1955, the Soviet Union was the leading country providing foreign assistance 
to Afghanistan. 
Special importance was given to equipping the Afghan army with Soviet (Warsaw Pact) weapons 
systems and to training the officer corps in both the Soviet Union and in the country itself. In 1977, the 
Soviet Union had 350 technical and military advisers in Afghanistan. In the period 1956–78, 3,000 
Afghan officers (air force, air defence, artillery, medical personnel and others) were trained in the 
Soviet Union. An even larger number of them were trained in different Warsaw Pact countries. As a 
result, the Soviet Union was not just providing assistance but also directly training the new armed 
forces of Afghanistan. The programme was ambitious and foresaw the introduction of new weapons 
systems and new types of forces, namely special forces. Many officers were indoctrinated during their 
education in the Soviet Union and were considered important Soviet resources in the country, although 
the authorities in Kabul did not trust them and hesitated in promoting them to senior positions. For this 
reason among others the PDPA and notably its radical wing developed strong roots in the army. By 
1978, its 5,000 officer members represented roughly one-third of the entire membership of the party. 
Afghanistan did not appear to Soviet officials as a terra incognita. Moscow had gathered long 
experience in assisting the country, although no single attempt at modernisation, from the 1920s 
onwards, had succeeded. Both Islamic and leftist opposition to the regularly changing governments in 
Kabul had grown considerably in the country before the 1978 coup. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, two prominent leaders of the armed resistance to the PDPA regime, had both 
recruited their supporters from the Muslim youth movement that had been established in the late 
1960s, which had grown almost in parallel to the national democratic youth movement led by Nur 
Mohammed Taraki, the official leader of the 1978 coup. 
2.  Technical assistance and capacity-building for the Taraki regime 
After taking over in Kabul in April 1978, the PDPA regime declared a policy of ‘socialist’ 
transformation of the country. It sought to win political and social support through the quick 
implementation of a series of reforms not entirely new to Afghanistan. These included, inter alia, the 
accelerated pursuit of land reform by distributing confiscated land among peasants. It put an emphasis 
on providing education to the predominantly illiterate population. The government intended to expand 
the state sector in the economy by developing industries. It also promoted the idea of women’s 
emancipation and particularly that of increasing women’s literacy. The government promised to 
ensure the equality of all peoples residing in the country. Mr Taraki (who served as President from 
May 1978 to September 1979) verbally committed himself to Islam and the neutral status of the 
country. 
At the same time, the regime developed ambitious plans for building state institutions. Given that local 
specialists had left the state administration en masse after the coup, the PDPA sought to compensate 
their exodus by importing expertise and know-how from the Soviet Union. This move resulted in the 
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2.1  The toolbox of the Soviet policy 
Following the request from Kabul, the Soviet Union launched a massive effort to provide technical 
assistance by seconding hundreds of advisers to the government in Kabul. A group of senior advisers 
from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) consulted the PDPA leadership on all relevant 
policy issues and specifically on the build-up of the PDPA party itself. Soviet advisers were seconded 
to all ministries. Each minister was provided with at least two advisers who worked on decisions to be 
taken and consulted with the ministers. Soviet advisers were tasked with building the security service, 
intelligence, social organisations and mass media. Particular importance was attached to restructuring 
the Afghan armed forces along the lines of the Soviet model. Priority was also given to modernisation 
and increased mobility. Advisers were seconded down to the regiment level. Political officers were 
introduced in the army in order to ensure its loyalty. 
By the end of 1979, 1,500 Soviet advisers had been seconded to the civil agencies of Afghanistan, 
with 3,500 to 4,000 military personnel and technical experts working in the armed forces of the 
country. Their general assignment was to transfer Soviet know-how in their respective areas by 
assisting the administration in decision-making and in the organisation of practical work. The more 
specific mandate of the advisers’ teams included four main objectives, to 
•  consolidate and broaden political and social support for the PDPA; 
•  increase the influence of the PDPA in the army; 
•  create social organisations with broad membership (youth, women’s and labour organisations); 
and 
•  set up the structures of the central government. 
In the government domain, the emphasis was put on seconding Soviet staff to central government. 
There were almost no advisers seconded to provincial administrations, which were left on their own. 
The Soviet Union took over the burden of economic assistance to Afghanistan, which steadily grew 
with demands from Kabul. It included, among other things: 
•  the supply of energy sources, especially petroleum products. Moscow compensated the 
interrupted supply from Iran and covered 62% of Afghanistan’s annual consumption; 
•  the provision of long-term credit on beneficial conditions; 
•  coverage of 80% of the costs of agreed projects worth some $450 million annually, totalling 
almost $2.3 billion appropriated over a period of five years; 
•  the costs of Afghanistan’s imports of consumption goods worth $250 million a year; 
•  food supplies; and 
•  training in the Soviet Union for students and military personnel. 
Moscow also massively increased the amount of military assistance (arms transfers) to the Kabul 
government. 
2.2 The  effect 
While the Soviet Union was providing intensive technical and material assistance to the Taraki 
government, the political ownership of the process largely remained with Kabul. The Taraki regime 
revealed little competence or comprehension of the developments in the provinces. Most importantly, 
the government displayed little ability or willingness to learn from those developments and improve its 
performance. All appointments were made on the basis of the political, tribal or clan affiliations of the 
candidates. Competence was not an issue at all. The inner strife between the two factions (Khalq and 
Parcham) of the PDPA paralysed the government, which had never managed to reach out to the 
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proved to have little knowledge themselves but also failed to appreciate the real situation in 
Afghanistan. Their advice was predominantly dogmatic and often exacerbated the failures of the 
government in Kabul. 
As a result, the top-down reforms did not increase the popularity of the government. Instead, they 
triggered a flow of refugees and opposition. It is characteristic, however, that it was not specifically 
the introduction of Soviet practices but largely changes towards social modernisation that alienated 
the initially rather indifferent population. Notably land reform provoked strong resistance in the rural 
areas. Peasants, en masse, refused to take land from the landlords whom they had traditionally seen as 
a buffer and a source of protection from the central government. The majority of provinces did not 
even think of introducing the reform. In July 1979, Kabul was forced to stop its implementation 
programme. Previously, the first major crisis that had shaken the Kabul government and alarmed 
Moscow concerned another issue, being the upheaval in Herat in March 1979 that had begun with a 
protest against women’s education. 
In addition, Kabul messed up its relations with the Muslim clerics who led the protest and resistance. 
It failed to deliver on the promise to ensure the equality of peoples. On the contrary, Hafizullah Amin, 
the mastermind behind the 1978 coup and Kabul’s policies in 1978 and 1979 (serving as Prime 
Minister in the Taraki government before succeeding as President), pursued the policy of further 
‘Pashtunisation’ of the country. 
The government in Kabul responded to the political strife within the party, the resistance to reforms 
and the mounting opposition by increasing the repressive nature of the regime. It not only sought to 
force through top-down reforms but also began to use military force intensively against the opposition. 
These tactics increased the isolation of the government and weakened support for it, which led to its 
loss of the army as an instrument of its policy. The number of deserters grew sharply. By the end of 
1979, the army had shrunk from 90,000 to 40,000 and had lost half of the officers. The government 
units often changed sides and joined the opposition. Units loyal to different factions in the PDPA 
repeatedly fought each other. The regime no longer trusted the army and sought to escape the collapse 
by Soviet military intervention. 
2.3 Moscow’s  response 
The Soviet leadership was aware of the danger of military intervention as it saw the Kabul regime 
increasingly being isolated and realised that intervention would result in fighting against the 
population. Therefore, Moscow’s response was threefold. It urged President Taraki to change his 
policies. Moscow was also prepared to increase the support given to the regime significantly and 
considered assistance to raise the combat readiness of Afghanistan’s armed forces dramatically. 
Kabul was urged in particular to 
•  broaden its social and political support by establishing a united front that brought together 
different strata of Afghan society. Such a front was viewed as a tool for political education and 
engaging the population; 
•  restore the unity of the PDPA and reintegrate the Parcham faction into the government. Moscow 
went as far as to advise Kabul to include the moderate Islamic opposition in the political 
consultations and even in the government; 
•  stop repression and torture, and abide by the legal norms; 
•  consolidate and strengthen the army; 
•  end the practice of government appointments based on loyalty to the Taraki (Khalq) faction;  
•  establish control along the borders with Pakistan and Iran in order to prevent insurgency; 
•  seek an arrangement with Pakistan; and 
•  combat the armed resistance on its own. 18 | ANDREI ZAGORSKI 
 
Moscow was prepared to increase significantly its financial, economic, military, ideological and 
technical assistance to help Kabul meet those ends. In April 1979, in a memorandum to the Politburo, 
the KGB Chief Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defence Minister Dimitri   
Ustinov and the head of the CPSU Central Committee for the International Department Boris 
Ponomarev laid out what was to become the Soviet policy: 
•  continued political support for Kabul; 
•  increased arms supplies, financial and economic assistance; 
•  the training of personnel; 
•  support for establishing a system of political education; 
•  the intensification of visits and exchanges at various levels; 
•  political and diplomatic measures to curb external interference; and 
•  briefings to other socialist countries about the measures to be taken. 
Yet few believed that this policy would work. In another memorandum of late June 1979, the same 
senior group on Afghanistan questioned the effectiveness of providing further support to Kabul. It 
described the army as the single most important instrument that could alleviate the situation. 
Hence, the emphasis was put on increasing the capacity of the armed forces to combat the insurgence. 
A large group of senior Soviet military staff inspected Kabul’s army in August 1979 in order to assess 
its needs and recommend policies to improve its performance substantially. 
3. The  invasion 
Moscow’s strategy to increase the capacity of the Afghan armed forces was never properly tested, 
although there were signs that it was unlikely to work. From September 1979 onwards, any larger 
operation of the army was conducted only with the approval of the Soviet military advisers. The latter 
worked on raising the army’s readiness and took over the planning of operations. Although the Soviet 
military registered some improvements in autumn 1979, this effect began vanishing by the end of the 
year. 
The strategy was not given time to be tested because of the coup in Kabul in September, which 
resulted in the murder of President Taraki and the takeover by Mr Amin (who served as President 
from September to December 1979). Few in Moscow would have expected President Amin to follow 
the political advice given and be able to consolidate the regime. Particularly the KGB was convinced 
that no arrangement with Mr Amin would help and that only his replacement could save the regime. 
The Soviet Union was prepared to intervene militarily in order to remove President Amin and install a 
more cooperative leader, doing so in December 1979. 
3.1 Moscow’s  objectives and tools 
The political agenda for Afghanistan was set in Moscow only after the invasion, in January 1980, and 
was similar to what the Kremlin had wanted from the late President Taraki. In succeeding Mr Amin as 
President, Babrak Karmal (the leader of the PDPA’s Parcham faction), was expected to 
•  consistently pursue the policy of restoring the overall unity of the PDPA; 
•  form a broad alliance of ‘leftist and democratic’ organisations under the leadership of the PDPA 
and reach out to young persons, especially students; 
•  negotiate with key tribes the terms necessary for ceasing the resistance; 
•  collaborate with moderate Islamic clerics in order to isolate ‘reactionary’ ones; and 
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The Soviet contingent dispatched to the country included 50,000 military personnel, 2,000 civil 
personnel and 1,000 KGB officers. This contingent was not only supposed to take control of important 
facilities and communications, but also to cultivate civil services, such as medical assistance to the 
population, and build schools, hospitals and repair roads. It was further tasked with establishing a 
system of political education around the PDPA in order to raise a new political elite in the country that 
would be committed to the socialist option. 
The strengthening of political education and propaganda was given high priority. Moscow 
provided additional staff for the Kabul bureau of the press agency Novosti, who were to help their 
Afghan counterparts prepare materials for printed media and disseminate printed matter and films. The 
Soviet measures included support for Afghan journalists. The focus was on the younger generation. 
Ideological cadres of the PDPA were trained at the Academy of Social Sciences under the PDPA 
Central Committee. Moscow finally shipped to Kabul the radio station that had been promised to the 
late President Taraki. 
3.2 The  effect 
President Karmal was more responsive to the advice given, yet at the same time he was perceived as a 
very weak leader. He began by promising a radical change in policy. A new constitution was adopted. 
The red banner of the rival Khalq faction was replaced by a green, black and red one. Some 15,000 
political prisoners were released. Decrees were issued to reverse the property confiscations that had 
taken place under the late President Amin. Wages and officers’ salaries were raised. Peasants were 
provided with seeds, fertilisers and credit. Prices for agricultural products were increased. The 
intentions to admit other ‘progressive patriotic parties’ and to hold free elections were declared. 
Kabul signalled a policy of reconciliation with Islam by readmitting religious symbols, although steps 
in that direction largely reproduced the rigid Soviet model. A department for religious affairs was 
established under the Council of Ministers and then transformed into a ministry at a later stage. In 
Kabul, 20 new mosques were constructed and 800 were repaired. The institute of field mullahs was 
introduced in the army, which partially helped to improve the morale of the troops. State funding was 
given to newly established religious institutions for the purposes of ‘explaining the goals of the April 
revolution’. State funding was also available for pilgrims. 
The key project President Karmal was supposed to work on was the establishment of a united national 
front to increase acceptance of the regime. A conference of Afghan ‘national and patriotic forces’ was 
established in 1980, which later became a national front in 1981 and included the PDPA, trade unions, 
the PDPA youth organisation, the Women’s Union, and the Union of Writers and Journalists. Those 
organisations represented 2% of the Afghan population. By 1983, President Karmal had succeeded in 
increasing the membership of the PDPA from 80,000 to 100,000. 
Despite some changes, the regime largely failed to meet the benchmarks set by the Soviet Union. The 
national front failed to find anchorage in the provinces. President Karmal sought to substitute it by 
reviving the traditional institution of the loya jirga – a grand council of the seniors of the local tribes. 
Kabul never risked holding ‘free elections’. And in 1981, it publicly admitted the failure of the land 
reform. 
The record on consolidating the army was ambiguous. By 1981, the number of servicemen had further 
dropped to some 25,000. Following pressure from Soviet advisers, Kabul reduced the age of the draft 
from 22 to 20, drafted reservists under the age of 35 for a second term and extended the length of 
military service to three years. These steps enabled the army to grow to 130,000 but did not help to 
improve its morale. The army continuously avoided engaging in fighting. 
Meanwhile, inner strife within the party continued. The PDPA and particularly its leadership remained 
isolated from society. The perpetual practice of politically biased appointments resulted in a further 
deterioration of the administration’s competence at all levels. The initiation of negotiations with 
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The more President Karmal failed to meet the benchmarks, the more repressive his regime became. 
Furthermore, Mr Karmal consistently pursued the policy of transferring burdens and responsibilities 
to the Soviet representatives. He largely succeeded in doing so. As a result, it was particularly the 
Soviet troops who were not only directly involved in warfare but who also took over the main burden 
of it from the summer of 1980. 
3.3 Moscow’s  response 
The Soviet Union grew increasingly disappointed with developments in Afghanistan and especially 
the performance of the leadership of the PDPA. Tension developed between Moscow and Kabul. As 
dangerous developments became more apparent, the Soviet leadership sought to respond by 
increasing weapons and food supplies, and by accelerating the training of Afghan officers. Yet it 
also became clear to Moscow that this strategy was not working out. The more resources were 
invested, the less was the effect of Moscow’s policy. 
The Kremlin gradually came to realise that continuing the war was not a viable option. In 1985, the 
commander of the 40
th army, the operative group of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff 
assessed the situation as hopeless and urged pulling out of Afghanistan. The option of improving the 
capacity of the PDPA regime to the extent that it would be able to master the problems on its own was 
no longer considered realistic. Previously, in 1982, Yuri Andropov, by then General Secretary of the 
CPSU Central Committee, had sought to explore the possibility of a political solution that was to be 
negotiated with Pakistan, but he had not been prepared to negotiate a regime change in Kabul. Even 
this limited attempt to change Soviet policy expired at the moment when Mr Andropov passed away in 
1984. A thorough review of Soviet policy in Afghanistan was not initiated until 1985, under President 
Mikhail Gorbachev. 
4.  The policy of national reconciliation 
The Gorbachev years are less instructive for the purposes of this paper. At this juncture, Soviet policy 
was no longer about the modernisation or reconstruction of the country but rather about identifying the 
best possible exit strategy. As President Karmal vehemently opposed the idea of a Soviet pullout, 
Moscow embarked on another change of leadership in Kabul, replacing Mr Karmal with Mohammed 
Najibullah, who took over as President in November 1986. 
Moscow pushed a policy of ‘national reconciliation’, which abandoned the concept of political 
monopoly on the part of the PDPA and admitted the possibility of transforming the regime by 
embracing the idea of a coalition government that included the opposition. This shift was the 
beginning of a gradual dismantling of the socialist experiment in Afghanistan. 
Despite some positive steps from that policy during 1987, not a single relevant resistance group 
engaged with Kabul. The opposition prepared for a decisive power struggle after the pullout of Soviet 
troops. In January 1989, it announced the creation of its own interim government in Rawalpindi in 
Pakistan. The United States insisted on the resignation of the PDPA. Pakistan insisted on the 
introduction of an Islamic regime and demanded the creation of an interim government in which the 
opposition was to comprise the majority. The Peshawar alliance would only agree to the establishment 
of an interim government for the purpose of monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops, provided it 
was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood. President Najibullah was not ready to 
give in to the Peshawar alliance’s demand for a majority. Moscow began to explore the possibility of 
inviting the former king, Zahir Shah, to return from abroad and lead national reconciliation efforts. 
Meanwhile, the single most important question was how long President Najibullah would be able to 
remain in Kabul after the Soviet pullout. Experts in neither the West nor the Soviet Union gave him 
more than three to four months. 
Therefore, Moscow’s exit strategy was focused on the means to extend the lifespan of the Kabul 
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ammunition and food prior to the Soviet withdrawal and sustaining these supplies thereafter. Moscow 
agreed to transfer weapons systems that were more sophisticated to Afghanistan. It continued to 
supply Kabul heavily with weapons and food throughout 1989 and 1990. Moscow intensified the 
training of Afghan officers, maintained a group of senior military advisers to the government and 
agreed to retain Soviet technicians in Afghanistan to assist in repairing military equipment. It also 
pledged to assist Kabul in establishing contacts with the opposition residing in Pakistan, Iran and 
Western Europe. 
Because of the massive economic and military support, the regime kept going longer than expected. 
Nevertheless, in September 1991, the Soviet Union and the US reached an agreement to cease 
weapons supplies to Afghanistan from 1 January 1992. From that point, the Najibullah regime 
survived only four more months. 
Conclusions 
The Soviet leadership became hostage to the idea first set out in 1979 that by no means could it afford 
to lose Afghanistan. That view triggered a fatal dynamic of conflict escalation, leaving little room for 
reconsidering and amending Moscow’s policy objectives to enable them to become more realistic. 
The Soviet knowledge of Afghanistan was rather superficial and the reality on the ground could not be 
comprehended through a pre-set template. The readiness of the Afghan population to embrace social 
change was not to the extent that Soviet leaders had assumed. And the assumptions made about the 
ability to mobilise wider political support for social change in the country’s Islamic society proved 
wrong as well. So too did the assumption that land reform could induce such support. 
The rejection of policy emanating from the Kabul government grew as a consequence of the heavy 
external presence – of both advisers and troops. The long record of friendly relations between 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was unable to alleviate the friction. 
Moscow saw technical assistance and military intervention merely as technical tools to strengthen the 
government in Kabul and stabilise the situation. Despite a dramatic increase in the amount of 
assistance provided, the situation did not improve – indeed, it worsened. The gap between the amount 
of assistance given and the effect achieved constantly rose. The dramatic growth in the number of 
Soviet advisers dispatched to the country did not make a difference. The advisers did not register any 
significant progress in achieving the benchmarks set by Moscow. 
The majority of Soviet advisers had little knowledge of the country. They proved rather incompetent 
and failed to provide Moscow with appropriate feedback. Yet Soviet discourse remained highly 
indoctrinated, thus preventing both Moscow and Kabul from sharing ownership of the process with the 
different political and social forces in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there was little or no coordination of 
activities among the groups of advisers. Representatives of various agencies developed different, even 
diverging views of the objectives to be achieved. 
The PDPA proved to be a weak and incompetent partner. At the same time, either Moscow had limited 
leverage over Kabul (during 1978–79) or Kabul demonstrated responsiveness (after 1980) but was 
unable or unwilling to follow the direction Moscow recommended. The regime remained isolated and 
failed to reach out to the provinces. 
The Soviet Union largely failed in capacity-building as regards both central and local government. As 
a result, Moscow allowed Kabul largely to transfer the burden and the responsibility for the unpopular 
policy onto Soviet advisers and troops. 
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Afghanistan 2007 
Problems, Opportunities and Possible Solutions 
Peter Bergen* 
he year 2007 will likely be a ‘make or break’ year for Afghanistan, for the international efforts 
there, and conversely, for the efforts of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies to turn the country 
back into a failed state.  
Afghanistan today looks something like Iraq did in the summer of 2003 with a growing insurgency in 
terms of the exponentially rising use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the deployment of 
suicide bombers, the decline of reconstruction efforts because of security concerns and a descent into 
chaotic violence in substantial portions of the country. Add to this the sad fact that the United States-
led occupation of Afghanistan has coincided with the country becoming the world’s premier source of 
heroin. 
There are, however, some key differences between Afghanistan and Iraq: Afghans have already 
suffered through more than 20 years of war and they are tired of conflict; in addition, the Taliban 
remain deeply unpopular and the American and NATO military presence is welcomed by the vast 
majority of Afghans. 
And so, 2007 represents a real opportunity to put the country back on course. Afghanistan will, of 
course, never become Belgium, but it does have a chance to succeed, as long as success is defined 
realistically: Afghanistan is likely to be a fragile, poor, weak state for the foreseeable future, but one 
where security can be significantly improved, allowing for the emergence of a more open society and 
a more vibrant economy.  
This paper is divided into three sections. The first part analyses Afghanistan’s problems. The second 
section of the paper addresses potential opportunities that exist for the country and the third section 
examines some possible solutions to Afghanistan’s problems. 
1. The  problems 
1.1  The return of the Taliban 
NATO and the US military are now battling the Taliban on a scale not witnessed since 2001 when the 
war against the Taliban began. When this author travelled in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, the 
Taliban threat had receded into little more than a nuisance. But now the movement has regrouped and 
rearmed. Mullah Dadullah, a key Taliban commander, gave an interview to al-Jazeera in the past year 
in which he made an illuminating observation about the scale of the insurgency. Mr Dadullah put 
Taliban forces at some 12,000 fighters – larger than the estimate informally conveyed by a US military 
official of between 7,000 and 10,000, yet a number that could have some validity given the numerous 
part-time Taliban farmer/fighters. Bolstered by a compliant Pakistani government, hefty cash inflows 
from the drug trade and a population disillusioned by battered infrastructure and lacklustre 
reconstruction efforts, the Taliban are back. 
In the past year, this author travelled to Afghanistan four times, meeting with government officials and 
ordinary Afghans. On two occasions, the journeys involved embedding with American soldiers of the 
10
th Mountain Division fighting the Taliban in the east and south of the country and on one travelling 
with a NATO delegation and interviewing key American military officers to get a sense of the 
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seriousness of the renewed Taliban insurgency. The impression gathered was that while the Taliban 
may not yet constitute a major strategic threat to the Karzai government, it has become a serious 
tactical challenge for both US troops and NATO soldiers. 
A hundred miles to the south of Kabul, for instance, the Taliban have appeared in force in nearly half 
the districts of the Ghazni province, which sits astride the most important road in the country, between 
Kabul and the southern city of Kandahar. It is today considered suicidal for non-Afghans to drive 
along that road without security. In southern Afghanistan, reconstruction has ground to halt and 
foreigners can only move around safely if they are embedded with the military or have substantial 
private security. Around Kandahar itself this past summer, fierce battles raged between the Taliban 
and NATO forces, with the latter encountering much stiffer resistance than they had anticipated. As 
put by a former senior Afghan cabinet member in September 2006, “If international forces leave, the 
Taliban will take over in one hour”.  
Why did the Taliban come back?  
First, key mistakes were made by the Bush administration in the first years of the US-led occupation 
of Afghanistan, owing to a variety of ideological idée fixes that included a dislike of ‘nation building’, 
an aversion to reliance on international forces and a preoccupation with Iraq as a supposed centre of 
world terrorism. That meant that Afghanistan was short-changed on a number of levels. The initial 
deployment of international troops was the lowest per capita commitment of peacekeepers to any post-
conflict environment since World War II. The Pentagon also initially blocked efforts by soldiers of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol outside Kabul and to extend a security 
umbrella to other parts of the country until August 2003. These early errors helped pave the way for 
the resurgence of the Taliban. 
Second, Afghanistan’s ballooning drug trade has succeeded in expanding the Taliban ranks. It is no 
coincidence that opium and heroin production, which now is equivalent to one-third (36%) of 
Afghanistan’s licit economy spiked at the same time that the Taliban staged a comeback. A US 
military official remarked that charities and individual donations from the Middle East are also 
boosting the Taliban’s coffers. These twin revenue streams – drug money and Middle East 
contributions – allow the Taliban to pay their fighters $100 or more a month, which compares 
favourably to the $70 salary of an Afghan police officer. Whatever the source, the Taliban can draw 
upon significant resources, at least by Afghan standards. One US military raid on a Taliban safe house 
in 2006 recovered $900,000 in cash. 
A third key to the resurgence of the Taliban can be summarised in one word: Pakistan. The Pakistani 
government has proven unwilling or incapable (or both) of clamping down on the religious militia, 
despite the fact that the headquarters of the Taliban and its key allies are located in Pakistan. 
According to a senior US military official, not a single senior Taliban leader has been arrested or 
killed in Pakistan since 2001 – nor have any of the top leaders of the militias headed by Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, who are fighting US forces alongside the Taliban. For example, 
Amir Haqqani, the leader of the Taliban in the central province of Zabul, “never comes across the 
border” from Pakistan into Afghanistan, as noted by a US military official based in Zabul.  
US military officials hold that the Taliban’s most important leadership council, the Quetta Shura, is 
based in the capital of Pakistan’s Balochistan Province; the important Peshawar Shura is 
headquartered in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province. In addition, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar operates 
in the tribal areas of Dir and Bajur. Jalaluddin Haqqani is based in Waziristan and al-Qaeda has a 
presence in both Waziristan and Chitral – all Pakistani regions that border Afghanistan. A senior US 
military official observed that the Pakistanis have taken “no decisive action on their border” to deal 
with the Taliban. In view of Pakistan’s upcoming 2007 presidential election, it can be inferred that the 
Pakistani government is doing even less than in the past because the Musharraf government is aware 
of how unpopular military action against the Taliban is in their border regions with Afghanistan. 24 | PETER BERGEN 
 
It should be noted, however, that the Taliban has released videotapes over the past year in which they 
attack the Musharraf government as an ‘infidel’ government because of its cooperation with the US in 
the war on terrorism. Moreover, the Taliban has attacked Pakistani government posts on the Afghan–
Pakistani border. One such attack killed six soldiers of the Tochi Scouts in January 2006, an attack 
that the Taliban’s new propaganda arm, Ummat studios, recorded on video and distributed to jihadist 
websites. The Pakistani government also denies it is providing a safe haven for the Taliban leadership.  
An explanation for the seeming dichotomy between the fact that US intelligence and military officials 
universally share the view that the Taliban is headquartered in Pakistan and the Pakistani 
government’s denial of this is that the Musharraf government does not completely control its own 
territory or security agencies. Under this line of thinking the Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistani 
military intelligence agency, at some levels continues to tolerate or maintain links with Taliban 
leaders. Many members of the Taliban grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan and they are very 
familiar with the country. In addition, an alliance of Pakistani religious political parties broadly 
sympathetic to the Taliban, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (or MMA), controls both the North-West 
Frontier Province and, to some degree, Balochistan, the regions where the Taliban are presently 
headquartered. 
A fourth reason for the Taliban’s recent resurgence is that it has increasingly morphed tactically and 
ideologically with al-Qaeda, which itself is experiencing a comeback along the Afghan–Pakistani 
border. The story of al-Qaeda’s renaissance begins with its eviction from Afghanistan in late 2001. 
Unfortunately, the group did not disintegrate – it merely moved across the border to the tribal regions 
of western Pakistan, where today it operates a network of training camps. A former American 
intelligence official stationed in Pakistan held that there are currently more than 2,000 “foreign 
fighters” in the region. The camps are relatively modest in size. “People want to see barracks. [In fact,] 
the camps use dry riverbeds for shooting and are housed in compounds for 20 people, where they are 
taught callisthenics and bomb-making”, explained a senior American military intelligence official. 
Taliban and al-Qaeda videotapes released in 2006 on jihadist websites also demonstrate that the camps 
in Pakistan’s tribal areas are training new recruits. 
Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Pakistan was noted by Dame Eliza Mannigham-Buller, the head of the UK’s 
domestic intelligence service MI5, who in a rare pubic statement in November said, “We are aware of 
numerous plots to kill people and damage our economy…thirty that we know of. These plots often 
have linked back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and through these links al-Qaeda gives guidance and training 
to its largely British foot soldiers here on an extensive and growing scale.” Similarly, the plot by a 
group of British citizens to blow up as many as 10 American passenger jets with liquid explosives, 
uncovered in the UK last August, was “directed by al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan”, according to the 
Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieut. General Michael D. Maples in his recent 
testimony to the US Senate Intelligence Committee. 
The Taliban’s strengthening influence 
The Taliban were a provincial bunch when they held power in Afghanistan, but in the past couple of 
years, they have increasingly identified themselves as part of the global jihadist movement, their 
rhetoric full of references to Iraq and Palestine in a manner that mirrors Osama bin Laden’s public 
statements. Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban commander, gave an interview to CBS News in December 
2006 in which he outlined how the Taliban and al-Qaeda cooperate: “Osama bin Laden, thank God, is 
alive and in good health. We are in contact with his top aides and sharing plans and operations with 
each other.” Indeed, a senior American military intelligence official observed, “trying to separate 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan serves no purpose. It’s like picking grey hairs out of your head.”  
Suicide attacks, IEDs and the beheadings of hostages – all techniques al-Qaeda perfected in Iraq – are 
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Afghanistan. Hekmat Karzai, an Afghan national security expert, points out that suicide bombings 
were virtually unknown in Afghanistan until 2005, when there were 21 such attacks.
1 According to the 
US military, there were 139 suicide attacks in 2006. This exponentially rising number of suicide 
attacks is mirrored by other grim statistics – IED attacks in Afghanistan more than doubled from 783 
in 2005 to 1,677 in 2006, and the number of ‘direct’ attacks by insurgents using weapons against 
international forces tripled from 1,558 to 4,542 during the same period. The year 2006 also saw a 
record number of 98 US military and 93 NATO deaths. At least 1,000 Afghan civilians died last year 
in clashes between the Taliban and the coalition; 100 of those deaths were the result of US or NATO 
actions, as reported by Human Rights Watch. 
Just as suicide bombings in Iraq have had an enormous strategic impact – from pushing the UN out of 
the country to helping spark a civil war – such attacks might also plunge Afghanistan into chaos. 
Already, suicide attacks and the Taliban resurgence have made much of southern Afghanistan a ‘no-
go’ area for both foreigners and any reconstruction efforts. Luckily, for the moment the suicide 
attackers in Afghanistan have not been nearly as deadly their counterparts in Iraq. As one US military 
official commented, almost all of the Taliban’s suicide bombers are “Pashtun country guys from 
Pakistan”, with little effective training. 
1.2  The drug economy 
That Afghanistan has a large drug economy is well known. Poppy cultivation for opium in 
Afghanistan grew by 60% last year and it is widely acknowledged that the Taliban resurgence is being 
fuelled by the profits of this opium trade. Afghanistan is the source of an astonishing 92% of the 
world’s heroin supply. 
Nevertheless, four fundamental propositions must be understood about the drug economy in 
Afghanistan: first, abruptly ending it would put millions of people out of work and impoverish 
millions more, as the only really functional part of the economy is poppy and opium production. 
Second, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and many rural Afghans have very 
few options to make money other than to engage in poppy-growing. Third, Afghan support for poppy 
cultivation is on the upswing – 40% now call it acceptable if there is no other way to earn a living, 
with two out of three Afghans living in the south-west saying it is acceptable, the region where much 
of the poppy is grown. And so ending the drug economy is simply not going to happen anytime in the 
foreseeable future. Fourth, and most importantly from an American and NATO national security 
perspective, drug policy in Afghanistan as it is presently constructed is helping the Taliban to thrive as 
they benefit from the trade. Bizarrely, our drug policy helps to fund our enemies. (Possible solutions to 
this problem can be found below.) 
1.3  Weakness of the Afghan state – A result of the lacklustre reconstruction 
efforts, corruption, weakness of the police and failures of Afghan 
governance 
The outgoing commander of US troops in Afghanistan, Lieut. General Karl Eikenberry, has drawn a 
clear link between reconstruction and violence: “Wherever the roads end, that’s where the Taliban 
starts”. Certainly, Afghanistan needs much more reconstruction. The key road from Kabul to 
Kandahar – a nightmarish 17-hour slalom course when taken under the Taliban regime and now a 
smoother 7-hour drive – remains the only large-scale reconstruction project completed in the country 
since the US-led invasion. Kabul residents have access to electricity only four to six hours a day, if 
they have electricity at all. Along with endemic corruption and the common perception that the 
billions of dollars of promised aid has mostly lined the pockets of non-governmental organisations, the 
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infrastructure gap feeds resentment among ordinary Afghans, some of whom may be tempted to throw 
in their lot with the Taliban. 
Some of the failures in Afghanistan are, of course, the responsibility of Afghans. Warlords such as Gul 
Agha Sherzai in Kandahar were given high political office. President Hamid Karzai’s staff is widely 
viewed as weak and inexperienced, although Mr Karzai has recently replaced his chief of staff. Highly 
competent ministers such as Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah and the finance minister Ashraf Ghani have 
been forced out of the government for no discernible good reason. There is little true representation of 
Pashtun political interests in parliament because President Karzai appears to distrust political parties. 
2. Opportunities 
There have been successes since the fall of the Taliban – as many as 5 million refugees have returned 
to Afghanistan from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Refugees do not return to places they do not see 
as having a future. Presidential and parliamentary elections have occurred with a high degree of 
participation by Afghan voters. Millions of boys and girls are back in school and the Afghan army has 
developed into a somewhat functional organisation. Afghanistan has also developed something of an 
independent press, with private television stations such as Tolo TV springing up. 
An ABC News/BBC poll released in December 2006 shows that despite the disappointments that 
Afghans have felt about inadequate reconstruction and declining security on a wide range of key 
issues, they have positive attitudes. It is classic counter-insurgency doctrine that the centre of gravity 
in a conflict is the people. And the Afghan people, unlike the Iraqis, have positive feelings about the 
US-led occupation, their own government and their lives. The conclusions of the ABC/BBC poll are 
worth quoting in some detail: 
Sixty-eight percent approve of [President] Karzai’s work – down from 83 percent last year, but 
still a level most national leaders would envy. Fifty-nine percent think the parliament is working 
for the benefit of the Afghan people – down from 77 percent, but still far better than Americans’ 
ratings of the U.S. Congress…Big majorities continue to call the U.S.-led invasion a good thing 
for their country (88 percent), to express a favourable opinion of the United States (74 percent) 
and to prefer the current Afghan government to Taliban rule (88 percent). Indeed eight in 10 
Afghans support the presence of U.S., British and other international forces on their soil; that 
compares with five percent support for Taliban fighters…Fifty-five percent of Afghans still say 
the country’s going in the right direction, but that’s down sharply from 77 percent last year. 
Whatever the problems, 74 percent say their living conditions today are better now than they were 
under the Taliban. That rating, however, is 11 points lower now than it was a year ago.
2 
These poll results, which are very similar to another poll taken in December 2006 by World Public 
Opinion.org through their Program on International Policy Attitudes, demonstrate that there remains 
strong support for the Afghan central government and US/NATO efforts in Afghanistan. Two other 
interesting points to note: according to both the ABC/BBC poll and that of World Public Opinion.org, 
no other Muslim nation appears to have a more negative view of Osama bin Laden. Both polls found 
that nine out of ten Afghans had a negative view of al-Qaeda’s leader. Similarly, nine out of ten 
Afghans say there is no justification for suicide bombings. 
3. Solutions 
3.1  On the drug trade 
The current counter-narcotics strategy that favours poppy eradication is by all accounts a failure. This 
is the conclusion of a range of sources, from Afghan experts to narco-terrorism specialists to the 
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reports by the US Government Accountability Office and the United Nations Office of Drug Control 
(both of which were published recently).  
Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard, has researched counter-
narcotics strategies in Columbia, Peru, Lebanon, Turkey and Afghanistan and found that terrorists and 
insurgents do not simply use the drug trade as a financial resource, but also draw substantial political 
gains and legitimacy from drug-trafficking. Consequently, an ‘eradication first’ policy is not only 
bound to fail – the crops will simply shift and appear elsewhere – but it will also foment a backlash 
among that segment of the local population that has developed ties to the belligerents through the 
narco-economy. For instance, local populations could withhold human intelligence that could be 
critical to the campaign against the reinvigorated Taliban insurgency. Instead, the US should focus on 
defeating the insurgents and concentrate their anti-narcotics efforts on interdiction and money 
laundering. 
The administration’s new plan to begin chemical ground spraying – a plan the US has pressured the 
Afghan government into accepting and which is supposed to begin in the spring (although it may have 
already begun), is in fact nothing new at all. It is simply another version of the eradication first policy, 
which will only solidify alliances between farmers and the Taliban. A new strategy is called for. 
Instead of eradication, we need to begin splitting the fragile links between farmers/local populations 
and the Taliban by concentrating our efforts on building up viable alternative livelihoods in both 
farming and other sectors. This approach means providing seeds for crop substitution and a build-up of 
roadways to transport those crops to market. In the short term, while that infrastructure is being 
established crop substitution will only really work if Afghans can obtain roughly the same income that 
they receive from poppy production for whatever crops are substituted. This point suggests that the 
international community should consider subsidies for Afghan crops such as cotton, fruits and nuts 
similar to the subsidies that the US and the European Union pay for the products of many of their 
farmers. This plan would not come cheap, but if it could substantially reduce the drug economy, it 
would weaken the Taliban and make the country much more secure – which is a trade-off worth the 
costs involved.  
While the narco-economy is valued at around $3 billion, most of that flows out of Afghanistan and 
farmers only receive about $600 million of it. Meanwhile, in FY2005, the US allocated almost $800 
million for the counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan, yet no more than 20% of that was targeted 
towards alternative livelihoods, and even that share was not spent in a coordinated fashion for national 
economic build-up. The US is clearly spending more money per year than the farmers make from 
opium and that money could be redirected towards subsidies for crop substitution. 
Another additional approach is to allow Afghanistan to enter into the legalised opiate trade for 
morphine used for pain relief, a trade that is presently dominated by countries such as India and 
Turkey. Despite some legitimate criticisms of this idea – principally how one would make sure that 
Afghan opium was only going into the legitimate market – one low-risk strategy would be to allow the 
legalised opiate trade to debut as a pilot project on a small scale in a province with reasonable security 
and smaller-scale opium production, thus allowing greater regulatory control. If this strategy worked 
in one province, it could then be implemented in other provinces. And the crop-substitution approach 
and the legalised opiate-trade approach are not ‘either/or’ solutions. Both could be implemented at the 
same time in different Afghan provinces. 
Congress could then amend the ‘80–20 law’ requiring US opiate manufacturers to purchase 80% of 
their opiate from India and Turkey (affording them a guaranteed market) to include Afghanistan. The 
latter is by far the most fragile democracy and economy of the three and the one in which the US has 
vital national security interests at stake, as the Taliban and al-Qaeda are substantially regrouping along 
the Afghan–Pakistani border. It is also worth noting that according to the UN, about 80% of the 
world’s population living in developing countries consumes only 6% of the morphine distributed 
worldwide, which suggests that there is a large untapped market for legal opiates. 28 | PETER BERGEN 
 
3.2 Rolling back the Taliban – More troops, better troops, fewer NATO 
caveats, a successful amnesty programme, more reconstruction, 
transforming the tribal belt in Pakistan and building up the Afghan police 
By all accounts, the spring of 2007 will be a bloody one. The present NATO strength of 33,250 is 
judged by NATO commanders to be insufficient by around 4,500 soldiers. The calls by Defence 
Secretary Robert Gates in January 2007 for additional American troops to be sent to Afghanistan are 
to be welcomed as not only will those forces help fight the Taliban, they will also send a signal to 
regional players such as Pakistan that the US is in Afghanistan for the long haul. Around two years 
ago the then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US was planning to draw 
down its forces in Afghanistan. That sent precisely the wrong signal to the region. (For the moment, 
3,200 US troops have had their tours extended by four months to cover the NATO shortfall.) 
One caveat about the call by Secretary Gates for more American troops is that it depends on which 
troops are eventually sent. According to Afghan officials, US Special Forces working with the Afghan 
National Army are the most effective soldiers to attack the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Similarly, NATO 
member states must increase their troop strength and reduce the number of ‘national caveats’ that 
prevent, say, the Germans from flying at night and other such caveats that hamper the effectiveness of 
NATO forces on the ground in Afghanistan. In December 2005, one senior NATO commander said he 
had 14 pages of national caveats with which to contend. While the British, Canadians and Dutch 
fought bravely over the summer in southern Afghanistan, other NATO member states that are part of 
the coalition must do more to match their efforts. NATO is also severely hampered by the lack of air 
assets it is able to draw upon. 
An amnesty programme formally launched in 2005 by the Karzai government offers one promising 
approach to containing the Taliban threat. In Qalat, the provincial capital of Zabul, in the spring of 
2006 this author witnessed US forces release Mullah Abdul Ali Akundzada, who was accused of 
sheltering Taliban members and had been arrested near the site of an IED detonation. In a deal 
brokered by the Karzai government and the US military, Mr Akundzada was handed over to a group of 
about 30 religious and tribal leaders, who publicly pledged that the released mullah would support the 
government. In an honour-based society such as Afghanistan, this programme is working well. 
According to both Afghan and US officials, only a handful of the more than 1,000 Taliban fighters 
taking advantage of the amnesty have gone back to fighting the government and coalition forces. 
Transforming Pakistan’s tribal belt is a critical national security interest of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the 
US and NATO countries, as that is where the Taliban has a safe haven and al-Qaeda is regrouping. 
Pakistan deployed at least 70,000 troops to the area in 2002, but they suffered hundreds of casualties 
and heavy-handed Pakistani tactics further alienated the population of the tribal areas. Over the past 
two years Pakistan has abandoned its ‘military first’ policy and started concluding peace agreements 
with militants in both South Waziristan and North Waziristan. Unfortunately, after the conclusion of 
the peace agreement in North Waziristan in early September 2006, there was a 300% rise in attacks 
from that region into Afghanistan according to the US military. And militants in Waziristan have since 
set up a parallel judicial system lynching and torturing civilians for infringements such as drinking, 
and documenting this on videotapes distributed by Ummat video, the Taliban’s propaganda arm. Much 
of what is going on in the tribal areas is opaque as the Pakistani government has prevented 
international journalists from travelling anywhere near these areas, and Pakistani journalists have been 
detained or even killed when they report on the tribal regions. 
This analysis is not the place to rehash the history of British and Pakistani rule in the tribal regions, 
which has certainly contributed to their problems, but the present Pakistani policy that has wavered 
between the fist and appeasement has not worked well either. Pakistan has promised an aid package to 
the region of $150 million while the US may also be prepared to grant substantial aid. A quid pro quo 
for this American aid is that the Pakistani government should allow international journalists and other 
neutral observers to visit the tribal areas (and not only for dog-and-pony shows organised by the AFGHANISTAN 2007: PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS | 29 
 
Pakistani military). A further quid pro quo is that the Pakistani government should arrest Taliban 
leaders living in Pakistan, a policy that should be strongly endorsed by NATO countries such as 
Canada, the UK and the Netherlands, countries that bore the brunt of Taliban attacks in the summer of 
2006. 
The US should also pressure Afghanistan to recognise the Durand line drawn by the British in 1893 as 
the border between Afghanistan and the Raj. The fact that Afghanistan does not recognise this border 
aggravates tensions with Pakistan and helps the militants to move back and forth across the border. 
(Suggestions by Pakistan that they will mine the 1,500-mile border to prevent militants crossing are 
both impractical and strongly opposed by Afghanistan, which has suffered thousands of civilian deaths 
and injuries from mines left over from the Soviet conflict and subsequent Afghan civil war.)  
Thus far, the US government has appropriated $27 billion for Iraqi reconstruction, but only $7 billion 
for Afghanistan – a country that is roughly the same size in population, a third larger geographically 
and utterly destroyed by two decades of war. Of the money appropriated, a State Department official 
has conveyed that only $2.5 billion has actually been spent, despite Afghanistan’s larger land mass 
and greater infrastructural needs. That works out to a paltry $20 per year per Afghan over the past five 
years. Without greater investments in roads, power and water resources throughout Afghanistan, the 
Taliban will surely prosper and continue to gain adherents.  
For that reason, the Bush administration calls for up to $10 billion in aid to Afghanistan, of which the 
$2 billion for reconstruction and $8 billion for building up the Afghan police and army are to be 
welcomed. One important caveat on the reconstruction aid is that much of that aid should be funnelled 
through the Afghan government rather than recycled to US contractors. According to Ann Jones, a 
writer who has worked in Afghanistan as an aid worker, unlike countries such as Sweden (typically 
incurring only 4% of its aid costs from “technical assistance”, which goes back home to Sweden), 
“eighty-six cents of every dollar of American aid is phantom aid”, ultimately lining American pockets 
rather than going directly to Afghans.
3 For their part, Afghan government ministries must be more 
efficient at spending reconstruction money. Last year these ministries only spent 44% of the aid they 
were given. This year they are likely to spend 60%. 
It is also time for the US to institute a long-term mini-Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. In early 2006, 
the Afghan government published the Afghanistan development strategy, which estimated that $4 
billion a year in aid for the next five years was needed to reconstruct the country. For this reason, the 
US should contribute at least half that sum every year for many years to come. Give the fact that the 
9/11 attacks emerged from Afghanistan and cost the American economy at least $500 billion, aid for 
Afghanistan so that it does not to return to a failed state is a good investment. The US should commit 
itself to long-term reconstruction efforts in part to counter the Taliban, which is likely to be a threat for 
several years to come, but also because having overthrown the Taliban the US has responsibilities to 
Afghanistan. And a functioning, democratic Afghanistan will have a powerful demonstration effect on 
countries that surround Afghanistan such Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian republics, none of 
which are truly democratic states. 
American aid should be tied to an Afghan public employment scheme similar to the Works Progress 
Administration programme implemented in the US following the Great Depression. Afghanistan has a 
chronic unemployment problem with a 40% unemployment rate and a desperate need for roads, dams 
and the clearing of agricultural aqueducts destroyed by years of war. Much of the labour required for 
these projects does not require great skill and millions of Afghans should be set to work rebuilding 
their country as a quid pro quo for a real American Marshall Plan for the country.  
In short, there should be a military, diplomatic and reconstruction ‘surge’ to Afghanistan, a country 
where such efforts have a fighting chance of real success. 
                                                      
3 See A. Jones, Kabul in Winter: Life without peace in Afghanistan, New York, NY: Metropolitan Books (2006), 
p. 267.  
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Strategic and Operational Measures to 
Curb the Growing Threat of Suicide 
Terrorism in Afghanistan 
Hekmat Karzai* 
onflict has been a constant factor during the last three decades of Afghan history, but there was no 
record of suicide attacks until 9 September 2001, when two al-Qaeda members assassinated 
Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, the leader of the Northern Alliance.  
After the coalition forces came to Afghanistan, the trend of suicide attacks started to emerge very 
slowly, with one attack in 2002, two in 2003 and six in 2004 (Figure 1). From this point onwards, 
however, the pace changed. Learning from the effectiveness of the insurgents in Iraq and other places, 
the groups carried out 21 attacks in 2005, with the southern city of Kandahar and the capital Kabul 
being the primary targets (Figure 2). In 2006, there were 118 suicide attacks (Figure 3), with the latest 
ones targeting political and religious figures including the former President and current Senate leader, 
Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi and the late Governor of Paktia, Hakim Taniwal. 
Figure 1. Suicide attacks since 2001 
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Source: Data from the CAPS Violent Actors Project, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul. 
 
As noted earlier, there are no records of suicide attacks taking place in Afghanistan prior to 9 
September 2001. It is also true that the Afghan Mujahideen (freedom fighters) have no history of 
employing this tactic against the Russians; nor was it used by the Taliban or Northern Alliance against 
each other. Thus, a crucial question arises: Why did the Taliban, al-Qaeda and others shift towards this 
tactic?  
                                                      
* Hekmat Karzai is Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Kabul. 
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Figure 2. Suicide attacks by province 
Number of Attacks by Provinces
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Kandahar
Kabul
Khost
Helmand
Heraat
Paktia
Paktika
Ghazni
Nangarhar
Orazgan
Zabul 
Farah
Balkh
Konduz
Nemroz
Parwan
Logar
Jozjan
Provinces
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
A
t
t
a
c
k
s
 
Source: Data from the CAPS Violent Actors Project, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul. 
Figure 3. Suicide attacks carried out during 2006  
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There are several specific reasons why the Taliban and the foreign elements have decided that suicide 
terrorism is a useful tactic for Afghanistan.  
First, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have concluded that suicide bombing is more effective than other 
tactics in killing Afghan and coalition forces. This conclusion is a direct result of the success of such 
groups as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and various 
groups operating in Iraq. Suicide attacks allow insurgents to achieve maximum impact with minimal 
resources. Data show that when the insurgents fight US and coalition forces directly in Afghanistan, 
there is only a 5% probability of inflicting causalities. With suicide attacks, however, the chance of 
killing people increases several fold.  32 | HEKMAT KARZAI 
 
Second, the Taliban and al-Qaeda believe that devastating suicide attacks instil fear in people’s hearts, 
leading people to believe that the government cannot protect them and thus further destabilising the 
authority of local government institutions. Consequently, the gap between the government and the 
population is slowly expanding.  
Third, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have successfully tapped into the expertise and training of the broader 
jihadist community. Militants have imparted knowledge on suicide tactics to Afghan groups through 
the internet and face-to-face exchanges, and these militants – with al-Qaeda’s assistance and 
recruitment from madrasahs in Pakistan – have supplied a steady stream of suicide bombers.  
Fourth, suicide attacks are extremely effective as an assassination tactic, particularly when there is 
substantial security around the target. Since 2006 the Taliban and al-Qaeda have begun to use suicide 
attackers as assassins targeting important personalities, including the late Governor of Paktia, Hakim 
Taniwal, the former Governor of Helmand, Mohammed Daoud and Pacha Khan Zadran, a member of 
the Afghan parliament.  
Finally yet importantly, suicide attacks have provided renewed visibility for the Taliban and their 
allies, which the guerrilla attacks were failing to generate. Given their high casualty rates and high 
profile nature, every suicide attack conducted is reported in the regional and international media, 
providing greater exposure for the cause. 
The origin of the attackers 
At the outset, there was a major debate about the identity of the attackers. Afghans especially were 
under the assumption that the majority of the suicide bombers were foreigners and such a tactic was an 
imported product. Yet the data implicates two groups of individuals who are involved in the attacks. 
The first group of attackers who are indeed responsible for a significant number of attacks consists of 
men of foreign origins, who are influenced by the global ideological jihad against the West, most 
notably the US. They see Afghanistan as the second front of that jihad (the first being Iraq), which 
provides them an opportunity to face the enemy in battle. These individuals are profoundly inspired by 
the various radical clerics and even the Taliban, who are constantly preaching around the world and on 
the thousands of jihadist websites, with statements like “Afghanistan has been occupied by the 
crusaders and it is a personal obligation of the Muslims to fight against them”.
1 Thus encouraged and 
motivated they come to Afghanistan with the ultimate goal of attaining the esteemed status of 
martyrdom and setting an example for the rest of the Muslim ummah. Many of them are from 
countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Chechnya.  
A second, small group of attackers carrying out suicide attacks comprises Afghans.
2 While Afghans 
believe it is neither culturally acceptable nor a characteristic tactic of the Afghan people, they ignore 
the fact that Afghan culture is no longer as isolated as it may have been in the past. At one point, a 
quarter of Afghanistan’s population of 25 million became refugees and a certain segment of that 
population attended madrasahs in Pakistan, where they were radicalised and immersed in extremist 
ideologies. The training continues today and there is no shortage of recruits from these madrasahs. 
Additionally, the relatively easy to access DVDs, VCDs and other forms of technology allows ideas to 
spread rapidly.
3 Underlying all of this is the exposure of Afghans to al-Qaeda, which has spread its 
                                                      
1 This quote by Mullah Dadullah is derived from his interview with Al Jazeera on 14 February 2006. 
2 This assessment recognises that many of the bombers may originate from training camps in Pakistan. But the 
fact that they may come over the border does not necessarily make them Pakistani. An Afghan war orphan, 
having been educated and trained in a madrasah in Pakistan and perhaps having lived there for 15 years, who 
then returns to Afghanistan as a suicide bomber is still an Afghan irrespective of whether he still has any 
relatives or roots in Afghanistan. 
3 During the course of this research, the author found many DVDs and VCDs that depict suicide operations, the 
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extremist global ideology to various groups. During their reign, from June 1996 to November 2001, al-
Qaeda and the Taliban established a very close ‘marriage of convenience’ wherein al-Qaeda supported 
and trained many Taliban cadres. Following the post-9/11 transformation of the Taliban from a 
conventional military force to an insurgent one, the effects of this training and indoctrination have 
become clear. 
Recommendations 
Afghanistan is not the first nation to face the threat of suicide attacks and is unlikely to be the last. 
Although dealing with the threat may be difficult for any state, it is not impossible, especially if 
operational and strategic measures are implemented.  
Operational measures 
•  Most importantly, the Afghan government must enhance the capacity of its intelligence in order 
to disrupt the network that organises and supports such activities. Intelligence is the initial link 
in the chain of thwarting any terror attack, but is crucial for thwarting suicide attacks before 
these occur. As many researchers note, suicide attackers hardly ever work alone. There is always 
an underground infrastructure that provides the essential financial and material resources and 
arranges everything else, including target identification and the time and date of the attack. 
Thus, the “crucial requirement in this struggle is ‘intelligence, intelligence, intelligence’”.
4 
•  Police training in particular should be enhanced to better deal with tactics and strategies. 
Currently, the Afghan National Police is given a couple of weeks of general training and nothing 
specific on threat assessment or analysis. The police should be taught two sets of skills: a) 
methods for engaging the local community in a friendly and professional manner, which can 
lead to information about anything unusual witnessed in the area; and b) advanced counter-
terrorism and counter-insurgency techniques, so they are better able to deal with violent groups. 
Police should also be provided with the necessary resources to handle the threat efficiently.  
•  The military, including both the coalition forces and the Afghans, have to stop using a heavy-
handed approach, most notably the kind that results in the killing of innocent civilians. Instead, 
they must work with the communities and develop trust among one another. On countless 
occasions, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have exploited the behaviour of the coalition forces to 
expand their pool of recruitment for suicide attacks. Similarly, the force used in operations 
should be controlled because if one innocent civilian is killed, it takes a way the goodwill of an 
entire family, community and tribe. 
•  The Afghan military has to familiarise itself with the Taliban’s modus operandi and analyse 
their pattern of attacks. Analysing the data, it is quite clear that the two main targets of suicide 
attacks are the southern city of Kandahar and the capital; accordingly, the security for both of 
these ‘hot spots’ must be increased with due diligence. Only by knowing the environment and 
protecting it will the military be able to anticipate future attacks.  
•  The Afghan coalition force must improve human intelligence in certain areas, whether in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan,  where the majority of the Taliban and al-Qaeda recruit. There are 
several madrasahs in Waziristan, located in the North-Western Frontier Province of Pakistan, 
which have been known for spreading a radical ideology of hate and instigating jihad in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
motivate the particular segment of the population that is disillusioned with the coalition forces and the Afghan 
government to become involved in the jihad. 
4 Quote derived from an interview with Dr Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the International Centre for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 21 April 2006. 34 | HEKMAT KARZAI 
 
Afghanistan. Gathering information about them and monitoring their activities can lead to 
further success.  
•  The coalition forces and the Afghan security sector must share whatever operational intelligence 
or information they collect on specific threats with their partners for regional cooperation. Only 
with the support and cooperation of the regional partners can those attacks that might have been 
planned from the outside be successfully prevented.  
Strategic measures 
•  The Afghan ulema [panel of religious authorities] must continue to oppose suicide bombing and 
issue fatwas to that effect. They should clearly explain that suicide bombing does not lead to an 
eternal life in paradise, nor the permission to see the face of Allah or the loving-kindness of 72 
houris [beautiful maidens] who will serve the suicide bomber in heaven. The ulema should not 
allow fatwas to be manipulated by the extremists for negative effects in either Afghanistan or 
the Muslim world.  
•  The moderate religious leadership throughout Afghanistan should be empowered and given 
opportunities to spread their message of peace and tolerance on the centre stage. Importantly, 
counter-ideological measures should be used such that religious clerics are engaged in initiating 
dialogue first with the population and second with the militants as well as their sympathisers in 
order to dispel ideologically the notions of suicide being compatible with Islamic jurisprudence.  
•  The international community must remain active in Afghanistan until it has developed its own 
institutions that can deal with matters of state security. Without continued assistance, 
Afghanistan’s fragile security institutions would crumble, repeating the history of the early 
1990s when the country was a hub of international terrorism and drug production. Moreover, it 
is vital that the organic capacity of the state security agencies is developed, so it does not appear 
to citizens as the mouthpiece of the West.  
•  Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbours are critical to its long-term stability and as such the 
country must establish strong regional ties, whether in commerce and trade or in the transfer of 
knowledge. Because of its landlocked status, Afghanistan must explore ways to develop its 
relations with its neighbours beyond basic diplomacy. The two most important neighbours are 
clearly Pakistan and Iran, and their support and assistance are essential in curbing the flow of 
terrorists from either the Middle East or Pakistan itself. In order to carry out attacks, terrorists 
must cross either of these two countries to enter Afghanistan.  
•  It is imperative that strong but informal ties be forged with village communities that live along 
the Afghan–Pakistani border, as some of these have been known to be safe havens for the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives. The government must have an ‘overall plan’ to deal with these 
communities and provide them with necessary services such as education and health care. It is 
crucial that the plan includes goals that improve the living standards of the average villagers. 
Concepts such as ‘winning hearts and minds’ must be employed. The majority of the population 
resent the Taliban; they do not wish to go back to the draconian rule that was forced upon them 
when the Taliban were in power.  
Conclusions 
Looking at the experiences of other states such as the US, the UK and many others – it does not really 
matter how strong or capable the government and security sector is – no government has been able to 
fully immunise itself from suicide attacks carried out by a group or an insurgency movement. For sure, 
Afghanistan will mirror this pattern. Yet by drawing from best practice, while incorporating issues of 
cultural and religious sensitivity, a rational middle way towards preventing them may be achieved.  
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Afghanistan: Mission Impossible? 
The Pakistani Perspective 
Ismail Khan* 
hen the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Americans were caught off-
guard and did not initially respond to it. So for a year and a half, interest in Afghanistan on the 
part of the United States remained limited, looking at the country as an extension or satellite of the 
Soviet Union. 
Towards the mid-1980s, however, the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Afghan resistance 
to the Soviet occupation drew the US into the conflict. The US soon realised that it had no other option 
than to operate through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to support and finance the Afghan 
resistance. All the funding came through Pakistan and was in turn distributed among the various 
resistance groups. In a way, by using Pakistan as a surrogate, the Americans did not know which 
group was receiving how much of the money being pumped in to shore up the Afghan resistance to the 
Soviets.  
There was recognition that while it was clear that the war was winnable, such an outcome was possible 
only with Pakistan’s help.  
But by the time the Soviets were beginning to leave Afghanistan, Pakistan had developed in-depth 
knowledge and experience in organising a guerrilla war to defeat one of the best and well-trained 
armies in the world. The Pakistanis came to understand that in order to make the guerrilla war a 
success it was imperative to bring the most powerful or most influential man on board. This tactic 
spawned what came to be known as warlordism in Afghanistan, which meant that whatever semblance 
of governance there had been, it fell apart and was replaced by anarchy. 
Anarchy spawned something worse: jihad for Islam, which became an overriding factor. The Arabs 
came over, led by the fiery Palestinian ideologue Sheik Abdullah Azzam, to use Afghanistan as a base 
and springboard for jihad. At the time, Pakistan and the so-called ‘free world’ led by the US were not 
very discerning about who came to help as long as they aided the cause – even Israel helped by 
supplying arms to the Mujahideen. 
The result was that the old system crumbled and no new system was put in place, which gave rise to 
the creation of small fiefdoms. There was total anarchy. The Arabs, who had come mostly from 
countries with dictatorial regimes, became outspoken and started to challenge their own governments. 
They had a stake in the anarchy, the power vacuum and the absence of centralised governance. 
The Taliban appeared on the horizon, initially supported by everyone among the war-weary Afghans. 
Pakistan had tired of supporting one group against the other and saw in the Taliban an opportunity to 
bring a friendly centralised government to its western borders. By promising to restore order, the 
Taliban did not have to use force. Wherever they went, they negotiated to seize control of districts, 
cities and eventually provinces as a way of gaining control of almost the entire country. And they 
succeeded in doing so without firing a single bullet, with the exception of the Shomali plain where 
they met stiff resistance from forces loyal to Ahmad Shah Masood. 
While the Taliban, who had come from religious seminaries with their own interpretations of 
puritanical Islam, decided to implement Islamic laws as they interpreted them, the West also made the 
diplomatic and political blunder of ostracising them instead of engaging them. This approach served to 
                                                      
* Ismail Khan is an Editor of Dawn (North-West Frontier Province) for the Dawn Group of Newspapers, and a 
Stringer for the New York Times in Peshawar. 
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strengthen the Taliban – when the Taliban needed and looked for support it came from Osama bin 
Laden, who offered them a hand of friendship and cooperation. 
Al-Qaeda made Afghanistan its base, not because they loved the country but because they needed a 
launch pad to plan and execute attacks like those of 9/11. When the Americans decided to invade 
Afghanistan, they decided to do so yet again on their own, enlisting Pakistan’s support but without 
involving it, apparently owing to a lack of trust. Washington tried to prop up an English-speaking 
Afghan commander and former Police Chief of Kabul, Abdul Haq, known among his Afghan 
colleagues as ‘Hollywood Haq’ for his theatrics in leading the resistance to rout the Taliban. He was 
caught and executed by the Taliban while attempting to sneak into Afghanistan, by co-opting some 
Taliban commanders who had formerly been Mujahideen commanders and were up for sale. The plan 
fell through. 
His execution and tragic exit created a big void, soon filled by another English-speaking Pashtun, 
Hamid Karzai. The Americans established direct contact with former Mujahideen commanders, 
unleashing the Northern Alliance on the Taliban and supporting their forces with targeted bombings. 
The Taliban dissipated into the countryside. The US had electronic intelligence but no human 
intelligence on the ground. Its effort to gather good human intelligence was further impeded by not 
involving Pakistan. 
The Northern Alliance, helped by American B-52 bombers, walked triumphantly into Kabul and set up 
a transitional government. The Taliban were cowed and the people genuinely believed they would see 
the advent of a new era of development and security. 
That did not happen, however; money was too short and too slow to come and security was on a back 
burner. The US-led coalition repeated the same error that the Soviets had made when they had invaded 
Afghanistan, by fortifying important cities and towns but overlooking key security arrangements to 
secure the eastern and southern Pashtun belt, largely inhabiting the Pakistani–Afghan border. Other 
initial mistakes by US-led coalition forces – such as targeting civilians on wrong information provided 
by commanders to settle personal scores together with the inability to move into the countryside and 
carry out development work – created an environment ripe for the resurgence of the Taliban.  
The winds began to change. For ordinary Afghans the myth of American invincibility and 
technological superiority dissolved when six years after the invasion the US had been unable to catch 
any of the so-called ‘high-value targets’ such as Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden or his deputy Ayman 
al-Zawahiri. The Afghan Pashtun began to doubt the effectiveness and professionalism of the 
American forces, through the forces’ failure to 
1)  carry out widespread development; 
2)  catch any of the high-value targets; 
3)  provide security and introduce some semblance of governance; 
4)  reduce corruption; 
5)  deter President Hamid Karzai’s appointment of and reliance upon former Mujahideen 
commanders, who were viewed as warlords by the common Afghans; 
6)  take steps to alleviate the perception that the Pashtun were under-represented in a government 
dominated by the Northern Alliance; and 
7)  stem the fear of reprisal attacks from Taliban insurgents (especially around Kabul) and to 
provide security to prevent them. 
Because of these and other factors, according to some analysts, the common man gravitated back to 
the Taliban, who were there on the ground – unlike the Americans and other forces who were largely 
confined or restricted to their camps. The Taliban were not the Mujahideen of 1979; they were better 
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seemed to the people to be a winning side because of their presence on the ground, unlike the 
American and allied forces. 
The fact that most of the former Mujahideen or the Taliban had been living in Pakistan as refugees for 
decades made it a lot easier for them to move in and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. They knew and 
understood the system as well as how to circumvent or bypass it without being caught. For decades, 
the Mujahideen and later the Taliban used Pakistan’s tribal region straddling along the Afghan border 
as a base from which to organise and launch attacks, recruit soldiers to their cause, find finances and 
return to as a fallback position. A careful study and analysis of the Mujahideen incursions into 
Afghanistan during the Soviet era would show that the Taliban continued to use more or less the same 
bases and routes to hit out at places in Afghanistan.  
Interestingly though, while Afghanistan blames Pakistan for all its troubles, many Pakistanis believe 
that extremism in Pakistan is fuelled from Afghanistan and not vice versa. The success of the Taliban 
in challenging the American-backed government in Kabul and the international forces has encouraged 
Pakistan’s own tribal militants (who had hitherto been subservient to Pakistani laws) to challenge the 
writ of the Pakistani government. The Pakistani tribal militants are beholden to the Taliban for finance 
and direction and look to them for leadership rather than the other way around, although the Taliban 
do obtain many of their recruits from Pakistan.  
A case in point is the situation in North and South Waziristan and the Bajaur tribal regions along with 
the Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts of the North-West Frontier Province, which are 
affected by what is generally called ‘Talibanisation’. Pakistani militants draw their strength and 
inspiration from the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Pakistani militants have wanted to emulate the sort of 
system the Taliban introduced in Afghanistan and some analysts hold that this has stemmed from their 
own weariness of the colonial system that Pakistan has followed since the British ruled the Indian 
subcontinent. For them, the Taliban system was based on locally accepted norms and values on both 
sides of the border. Therefore, it has been the inability of Pakistan, the US, NATO and the Afghan 
government to give them an efficient system of governance that has moved them to the Taliban camp. 
The tribes on both sides of the Pakistani–Afghan border have always obeyed the mandate of the 
strongest force – in this case, the Taliban and the militants – which in turn has raised the spectre of 
vigilantism. They are doing what the government should have been doing for them, providing security 
and dispensing justice. 
Pakistan’s tribal conundrum 
Pakistan sent thousands of soldiers, for the first time since its inception in 1947, to its tribal borders 
with Afghanistan in order to stop the al-Qaeda operatives fleeing American bombings in Tora Bora in 
eastern Afghanistan from entering Pakistan.  
Although Islamabad had been able to control its borders in the Khyber and Kurram tribal regions 
effectively and as a result managed to round up over a 150 al-Qaeda operatives in a single haul, it is 
not clear why similar action was not taken in the restive North and South Waziristan tribal region. At 
the time, the regional military commander (now the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province), 
Lieut. General (retired) Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai denied that there were foreign militants in the 
tribal region, an argument vehemently rebutted by Pakistan’s premier intelligence bureau, Inter-
Services Intelligence. Initially reluctant, when the army finally did move to act on good sound 
intelligence in June 2002 in Azam Warsak in South Waziristan, the bloody gun battle that left ten 
soldiers including two officers dead made abundantly clear the challenges that lay ahead.  
More troops were rushed in and in March 2004, an operation was launched to flush out foreign 
militants in Kaloosha, South Waziristan. The security forces suffered massive casualties. The 
operation led to a series of attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes and 
rocket attacks on government and security installations.  38 | ISMAIL KHAN 
 
The situation was pretty grim, with security forces almost confined to their military barracks and 
garrison. The government entered into an agreement with tribal militant commanders known to have 
been harbouring foreign militants. The military commander at that time, Lieut. General Safdar 
Hussain, flew into Shakai in South Waziristan in April 2004 to sign the controversial agreement with 
top militant commander Nek Mohammad and four others.  
Predictably, the agreement soon collapsed after the militants refused to agree to the registration of 
foreign militants with the government, a key element of the agreement. The collapse led to more 
attacks and Nek Mohammad was killed in a precision missile attack a few months later.  
Violence escalated and spread to the more difficult tribal region of South Waziristan, dominated by the 
Mehsud tribe, where military convoys came under ambush and IED attacks. A tribal militant and a 
former Guantanamo Bay prisoner, Abdullah Mehsud, plotted and kidnapped two Chinese engineers 
working on an irrigation project. One of the engineers was killed in a rescue operation. 
The attacks continued throughout 2004–05 and 160 pro-government tribal elders were eliminated by 
militants in targeting killing. Journalists also came under fire: two were killed, one was kidnapped and 
others were forced to flee the region.  
The government once again reached out to militants, this time signing a peace agreement with top 
militant commander Baitullah Mehsud in February 2005. The agreement has brought relative peace 
although in the process the government writ in South Waziristan has been utterly lost. Militants, both 
local and foreign, hold complete sway over the entire tribal region, operating a virtually parallel 
administration. The government writ is confined to the front walls of the Scouts Camp in Wana, the 
regional headquarters of South Waziristan.  
By 2006, the situation had also begun to deteriorate in neighbouring North Waziristan, where militants 
had started challenging the writ of the government by attacking government and security installations. 
The government soon entered into another peace agreement, this time with the militants in Miramshah 
in North Waziristan. The 5 September 2006 peace agreement with the militants stipulated that the 
government would not carry out air or ground offensives, and in return, the militants agreed not to 
attack government or security installations. The agreement was seen by critics as a major concession 
to the militants, having failed to address two key demands: a) cross-border infiltration and b) the 
presence of foreign militants.  
At the same time, the government was also striving to strike a similar peace deal with the militants in 
the Bajaur tribal region. The American air strike in Damadola, apparently targeting al-Qaeda’s ‘no. 2’, 
also killed women and children, prompting public uproar. The air strike was followed by another in 
the same area; this time Pakistan owned up to the strike much against local belief that it was carried 
out by the Americans, effectively sealing the fate of any government–militants’ deal in Bajaur.  
The two attacks in Bajaur and the January 2006 attack on a cluster of compounds in South Waziristan 
led to a spate of suicide bombings aimed at military and police officials, leaving more than 50 dead. 
These incidents were demonstrative of how the government swung like a pendulum from one extreme 
to the other, from using force to what appeared total appeasement and capitulation to the militants and 
in so doing effectively ceding the writ of the state to the militants.  
Arguably, the Waziristan tribal region is now more difficult to administer than it was say, three years 
ago. As is evident, the agreements have failed to address key issues of cross-border infiltration and the 
presence of foreign militants in Pakistan’s tribal region, where militants continue to operate and recruit 
more freely than ever.  
Islamabad, which has continued to scoff at international criticism that Pakistan is not doing enough to 
stop cross-border infiltration, has pointed to the deployment of around 80,000 troops and 187 border 
posts. But at a press conference in Islamabad on 2 February, President Pervez Musharraf candidly 
admitted that there had been incidents in which some border guards had turned a blind eye to cross-
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Pakistan, as it appears, is facing its own dilemmas. It has been finding it hard to explain and persuade 
its own tribespeople of what has largely been seen at home as a policy U-turn by Islamabad, in 
rejecting the Taliban and allying itself with the US in the post-9/11 war on terror.  
The tribespeople, predominantly illiterate, poor and conservative, are finding it hard to understand the 
difference between the Soviet ‘occupying forces’ and the US ‘liberating forces’ and just how the 
Mujahideen, who had earlier been hailed by the West as heroes, turned into villains overnight. This 
seemingly quick shift in policy and transition is too complicated a business for the tribespeople, who 
are now flocking to the Taliban to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan from ‘foreign invaders’. So while President 
Musharraf has taken the stance of allying himself with the US, there are many in Pakistan’s tribal 
regions who do not share his view.  
Pakistan’s other predicament is that if it tries to control and rein in tribal militants from crossing the 
border to fight in Afghanistan, the militants level their guns at Pakistani forces and target government 
and security installations through ambushes, IED and suicide attacks.  
Thus, the situation in the tribal regions has a direct bearing on internal security. There are also political 
implications. Military operations and air strikes have resulted in a political backlash and outcry, 
particularly from the religious–political alliance that is ruling Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province 
and sharing power with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League in the province of Balochistan. 
While there have been some discussions and debates in the Pakistani parliament about the situation in 
the tribal regions as well as the violence and subsequent military operations, the government has not 
been able to formulate a consensus or achieve across-the-board political or public support for its 
policies there. 
With national elections only a few months away it also remains to be seen whether General Musharraf, 
so close to his bid to seek re-election as President, will want to take the political risk of launching yet 
another military operation in Waziristan to wrestle control from the militants. Such a move is 
especially questionable given the absence of broader political support for his pro-US policies and his 
reluctance to reach out to more secular political parties, such as the Pakistan Peoples’ Party of former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Pashtun nationalist parties like the Awami National Party.  
After exercising different options, from the use of military force to deal with militancy to engaging the 
militants directly, the government does not appear to be in the mood to go for a massive military 
operation. If statements by President Musharraf are any indication, the government intends to give the 
political process a chance, with the military approach taking a backseat. 
The political process means engaging tribespeople as well as tribal militants in an effort to restore 
peace in the region, buy time to carry out development, foster tribal stakes in the system and extend 
the state’s authority and writ. It is a long and time-consuming process and it is not clear whether 
Afghanistan and its international backers, chiefly the US, will have the patience to let Pakistan try out 
the option amid growing violence across the border. 
This proposition is a difficult one and something that has crumbled in the past after air attacks by 
either the US or Pakistan under pressure from Washington, reigniting the flames of violence in the 
restive tribal region. But government officials are hopeful that if allowed, with patience and 
perseverance, they can turn the tide against militancy in the region. They argue that by cutting deals 
with tribespeople and militants, the government could buy enough time to carry out massive 
development and create job opportunities to wean unemployed, poor youth away from militancy.  
Peace is essential for development and requires concerted effort by Pakistan and the international 
community to inject funds to build up what are clearly the most underdeveloped regions in the 
country. There are already some signs that the tribespeople who had wholeheartedly welcomed their 
foreign ‘guests’ are growing weary of them in the face of the rising killings, kidnappings and robberies 
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that have hit the region, leading to a stand-off between foreign and local militants. It is another matter 
that a much weaker administration there could not exploit such public sentiments and turn the tide 
against the foreign militants. 
A strategy to deal with the situation  
What then could work in the tribal region? The answer may lie somewhere half-way between a 
military and a political process: an intelligent combination of the two could create an atmosphere of 
peace and development, which in turn requires a well thought-out strategy to deal with the situation.  
What is needed therefore is a good and efficient system that brings development, security and job 
opportunities to a population with the lowest socio-economic indicators in the entire region. It is a 
protracted process but a recipe for lasting peace devoid of any militancy.  
There is also a need to change the overall strategy from a colonial approach to a neo-colonial one, 
which entails the necessary development along with more cash and better security. Again, the solution 
is not going to be further militarisation of the conflict but a considered combination of the political as 
well as the military approaches. 
The government, in consultation with local tribes and taking into account their sensitivities needs to 
re-establish the network of checkpoints that it abandoned after the peace agreements with the 
militants, as well as disperse the militants and deny them territory in which to operate and train.  
Some analysts believe that tribespeople on both sides of the border can settle political matters among 
themselves and with the Taliban and militants, if allowed to do so freely without attaching any pre-
conditions or strings. The worst of them, the former Mujahideen commanders who have always had 
their daggers drawn, would also continue to negotiate with each other through intermediaries. There is 
a sense in some circles in Pakistan that this could still be achieved. And in so doing, while the Taliban 
would not be immediately removed from the political scene, they could become important power 
brokers who could later be neutralised over a period of time.  
In addition, the forces would have to go and occupy the area, spreading out and preventing the Taliban 
the freedom to move. They would have to operate or initiate massive development and reconstruction 
projects involving the local tribespeople, buy-off the influential tribal elders by granting them 
contracts for road construction, hospitals, schools, irrigation systems, etc., and thus enable the tribes to 
have a stake in the new order.  
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